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A Quantitative Analysis of Antitrust Remedies
SETH G. BENZELL *
FELIX B. CHANG †
This Article advances a novel theoretical model for assessing
policy interventions against Facebook. As prosecutors barrel
forward against digital platforms, soon it will fall upon courts
and, eventually, regulators to devise remedies. We argue that any
sensible solution must include quantification of the welfare effects
on the platform’s various constituents. Our model prioritizes the
effects upon total societal welfare—or, in economists’ terms, social
welfare. Applied to Facebook, the model calculates social welfare
as the sum of four components: (i) consumer welfare; (ii)
advertising profits; (iii) tax revenues; and (iv) the value of a large
user base.
Drawing on surveys of over 57,000 Facebook users, the model
captures the nuances of demand for the social network to predict
the consequences of reforms such as taxes, divestitures, and user
rebates. This approach is based on the theoretical and empirical
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literature on multisided platforms from economists, including
most prominently the Nobel laureate Jean Tirole. We find that
breakups which undercut the platform’s network effects are
among the most damaging solutions. By contrast, properly
designed taxes and user-unionization might raise the total surplus
of the platform, even without creating more competition. We also
canvass other interventions, gauging their abilities to maximize
the benefits to consumers of engaging with Facebook.
This Article’s primary contribution is to ground debates over
digital platforms in tangible, quantifiable terms rather than grand,
open-ended aspirations. Each of the estimates in our formulation
of welfare is subject to pushback, but by embracing quantification,
we aim to elevate the theoretical discourse in antitrust. Ultimately,
we hope that our model forces remedy designers to confront—
and publicize—how they quantify welfare effects upon
consumers and, more broadly, society.

3/7/2022 2:39 PM
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I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes over digital platforms, though intense, are rarely
accompanied by measures of social welfare. On market definition,
critics and defenders of a two-sided platform might clash over
whether the relevant market is one or both sides but then fail to
calculate the platform’s welfare effects. 1 More fundamentally,
scholars are debating antitrust’s very goals—such as how broadly
to conceptualize consumer welfare and whether antitrust should
advance noneconomic objectives. 2 These debates are qualitative,
often eschewing definable and measurable variables for polemic.
Quantitative contributions, by contrast, are scant.
The unwillingness to gauge social welfare hampers objective
assessment of proposals to rein in digital platforms—a deficit that
has taken on heightened urgency with the filings by the
Department (“DOJ”), Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), and
state attorneys-general (collectively, the “State AGs”) against
Google and Facebook. 3 Prior to their dismissal, 4 these went
further than any prior government intervention against a digital

See Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 2274 (2018)
(offsetting losses on the merchant side of American Express with gains on the
consumer side). See also John B. Kirkwood, Antitrust and Two-Sided Platforms:
The Failure of American Express, 41 Cardozo L. Rev. 1805 (2020); David S.
Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. ON
REG. 325 (2003); Lapo Filistrucchi et al., Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets:
Theory and Practice, 10 J. Competition L. & Econ. 293, 301-02 (2014).
2 See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME. L.
REV. 191 (2008); Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2253 (2013); Sandeep Vaheesan, The Twighlight of the Technocrats’ Monopoly on
Antitrust?, 127 Yale L.J. Forum 980 (2018).
3 U.S. v. Google, Compl., Case 1 1:20-cv-03010 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 2020); FTC v.
Facebook, Inc., Compl. No. 2020-cv-3590 (Dist. Ct. D.C. 2020); New York v.
Facebook, Inc., Compl. No. ___ (Dist. Ct. D.C. 2020).
4 FTC v. Facebook, Inc., Mem. Opin. No. 2020-cv-3590 (Dist. Ct. D.C. 2021).
1
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platform. 5 Among other remedies, the FTC and the State AGs
called for divestiture of Instagram and WhatsApp. 6
However, not all remedies are the same: happy breakups
maximize social welfare, but botched ones uniquely limit
platform usage without offsetting gains to competition.7
Deprived of the proper tools, courts and regulators risk adopting
policies that only marginally improve welfare—or, worse, destroy
it. We argue that any sensible solution must be based on a
quantitative evaluation of the welfare effects of remedies on
different parties. In particular, the effects upon total societal
welfare—or, in economists’ terms, social welfare, should be
prioritized—and we suggest a way forward for doing so.
We advance a model for quantifying social welfare in digital
platforms, whose value stems from their network effects. 8 The
economist on our team created the model to account for price
discrimination and demand heterogeneity,9 two traits that are
often overlooked in the amorphous concept of network effects.10
As an illustration, we apply the model to Facebook, using data

FTC v. Facebook, Inc., Compl. No. 2020-cv-3590 (Dist. Ct. D.C. 2020); New
York v. Facebook, Inc., Compl. No. ___ (Dist. Ct. D.C. 2020).
6 See FTC v. Facebook, Inc., Compl. No. 2020-cv-3590, § X. See also Menesh S.
Patel, Merger Breakups, 2020 WISC. L. REV. 975, 1023–27.
7 To paraphrase the oft-quoted beginning of Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina (“All
happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”).
8 Network effects refer to a platform’s increasing value as it draws more users.
See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 424, 424 (1985); Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479,
481 (1998).
9 See Seth Benzell & Avinash Collis, Multisided Platform Strategy, Taxation and
Regulation:
Model
and
Application
to
Facebook
(2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=3619535.
10 For a classic study of the nuances of multisided platforms, see Jean-Charles
Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON.
ASSOC. 990 (2003).
5
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gathered from 57,000 users. 11 The model can be calibrated to
myriad data sources, which enables us to evaluate proposals to
constrain digital platforms, such as taxes, 12 breakups, 13 and
mandatory interoperability. 14
Elsewhere, Seth Benzell and Avinash Collis have articulated
the model’s contributions to the theoretical and empirical
literature on digital platforms. 15 Here we extend the discussion to
law and policy circles, providing a tool that can be verified or
disproven to move discussions beyond theory and polemics and
closer toward implementation. Applied to Facebook, the model
calculates social welfare as the sum of four components: (i)
Facebook’s consumer welfare; 16 (ii) the platform’s after-tax
advertising revenue; 17 (iii) tax revenues raised from Facebook;18
and (iv) the value to Facebook of maintaining a large user base. 19
Each of these elements is subject to pushback (some more than
others), but all of them can be reduced to numbers. With further
research, we can even insert estimates of Facebook’s negative

Although the company has now rebranded itself “Meta,” we refer to its old
name because of the close association with its core app, Facebook Blue, which
is also the Article’s focus.
12 Paul Romer, A Tax That Can Fix Big Tech, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2019; Paul De
Grauwe, Why Facebook Should Be Taxed And How To Do It, SOCIAL EUR., Oct. 30,
2017.
13 Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, Medium, Mar. 8,
2019; Chris Hughes, It’s Time to Break Up Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2019.
14 Fiona Scott Morton et al., Report from the Comm. for the Study of Digital
Platforms, Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State (2019).
15 Seth G. Benzell & Avinash Collis, How to Govern Facebook: A Structural Model
for Taxing and Regulating Big Tech (2020).
16 We quantify this by figuring out how much users would hypothetically be
willing to pay for the platform. See infra Section IV.
17 If no marginal costs are assumed, an assumption that more or less holds
steady for platforms exhibiting network effects, then this variable should be
equivalent to Facebook’s pre-corporate tax profits. See infra Section IV.
18 This implicitly assumes that the government puts tax revenues to productive
use.
19 We attribute this value to future expected profits that will flow from
maintaining a large user base now. See infra Section IV.
11
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externalities (e.g., misinformation and political polarization) into
the equation, though these parameters are presently more
speculative. 20
Going through the motions of parametrization forces us to
articulate what we measure and how. 21 For instance, we capture
Facebook’s consumer utility, an expression of its network effects,
through a combination of surveys, government sources, and data
from Facebook’s advertising and quarterly reports. 22 More
importantly, distilling social welfare to a set of variables
highlights what we do not know and cannot quantify. By
separating loyal Facebook users from casual ones, for example,
we can gauge (and therefore know) Facebook’s profits in a world
where the platform advertises more heavily to inelastic users to
squeeze out profits. The fact that Facebook does not do so
suggests that it prizes a large user base beyond a certain
threshold—or, put differently, that another strategy (which we do
not know) is driving the decision to forego intense advertising to
inelastic users. This importance of a large user base feeds into our
model of social welfare, but its quantification is subject to
challenge.
The greatest contribution of a model that measures social
welfare is its practical application for policy assessment. Like
many scholars and regulators, we are convinced of the
anticompetitive tendencies of the technologies underlying the
digital economy. 23 Yet as the conversation barrels toward
solutions, we see that breakups, taxes, and interoperability are
See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2016) (privacy); Sanjukta M. Paul,
Uber as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and Its Implications, 38
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233 (2017) (labor).
21 Parameterization is the process of breaking down a concept into its
constituent parameters.
22 See infra Section IV.
23 See, e.g., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST,
COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF
COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 133 (2020) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
20
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being proffered without much differentiation. Numerous
questions remain. Which path maximizes welfare—a horizontal
breakup that yields two “Baby Facebooks,” 24 or a vertical break
up that might disgorge WhatsApp or Instagram? 25 And how does
interoperability stack up against divestiture? Quantifying the
welfare effects of each remedy can allow us to prioritize the most
feasible and consequential ones for implementation.
Our model indicates that the best redress is for Facebook to
compensate users for using the platform. This validates the “data
as labor” framework Glen Weyl and others, who posit that usergenerated data should be treated as a production input, similar to
labor. 26 Data as labor cuts through the Gordian knot of antitrust
in zero-price markets, where consumers do not pay fees to use a
product but instead trade their attention and privacy. 27 In these
markets, regulators have struggled to articulate a coherent set of
solutions because they have not fully appreciated the harms.
Direct compensation for usage fosters positive network effects (by
encouraging more people to use the platform) while limiting
advertising (which is indispensable to platform operators) to
where it is most productive. Going beyond the total welfare
standard, this policy would also foster desirable distributional
consequences, transferring welfare from Meta shareholders to
Facebook users.
This was the approach taken against the Bell System. See United States v.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 227 (D.D.C. 1982).
25 This was the approach taken by the European Union against Microsoft. See
Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, T-201/04 (2007) 2007 EUR. CT. REP. 289. Cf. U.S.
v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
26 See ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING
CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY (2018). See also Radical
Exchange Foundation, The Data Freedom Act, Draft Legislation and Commentary
(2020), https://www.radicalxchange.org/files/DFA.pdf; Erik Rind & Matt
Prewitt, If Data Is Labor, Can Collective Bargaining Limit Big Tech?, TECHCRUNCH,
Oct. 12, 2020, https://techcrunch.com/2020/10/12/if-data-is-labor-cancollective-bargaining-limit-big-tech/.
27 See John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U.
PENN. L. REV. 149 (2015).
24
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We find that the worst approach is a breakup that
compromises platform quality and network effects without
fostering competition. A botched horizontal breakup would result
in Baby Facebooks, each monopolizing a market segment.28 A
vertical breakup with no procompetitive effects would also
degrade welfare. A generation ago, when the 1982 consent decree
split up the Bell System, the Department of Justice also required
that the post-divestiture Bell Operating Companies provide
competing carriers access to their infrastructures that was “equal
in type, quality, and price.” 29 For the modern analog, digital
platforms, the lesson is that divestiture by itself is an incomplete
and counterproductive panacea; at a minimum, it must be paired
with nondiscriminatory access. 30
By contrast, the first-best solution is a nationalized platform
that subsidizes usage and runs at a loss, thereby maximizing
network effects. Yet although nationalization responds to the
reality that digital platforms have become an indispensable
infrastructure, this approach is politically infeasible. It may also
entail unpredictable inefficiencies due to government control.
Therefore, we settle on the host of possibilities between
nationalization and botched breakups. These include
interoperability, taxes on users, taxes on revenue, and data as
labor, all of which harness network effects while restricting
advertising.
For an example of market division, see Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498
U.S. 46 (1990). See also Kenneth M. Davidson, The Competitive Significance of
Segmented Markets, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 445 (1983).
29 See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Modification of Final Judgment § II.A, reprinted in
United States v. AT&T, 552 F.Supp. 131, 227 (D.D.C. 1982) [hereinafter MFJ].
See also Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1330-34 (1998).
30 Even then, judicial or regulatory mandates may need to be accompanied by
continuing oversight. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 35 (“even after the
MFJ, the [1992 House Committee] report found, the FCC had failed to prevent
the RBCOs [post-divestiture Baby Bells] from using their local monopolies to
commit a number of anticompetitive violations, many eerily reminiscent of predivestiture Bell System abuses”) (internal quotations omitted).
28
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Before this Article proceeds further, a discussion of
nomenclature is in order. We use “social welfare” to mean total
welfare, comprised in our model of four parts. Economists and
many antitrust scholars embrace social welfare because of its
comprehensiveness. 31 As a fulsome gauge of welfare, it captures
more than just the effect on consumers. For digital platforms in
particular, a consumer welfare standard can be particularly
deceptive because prices hover at zero. 32 In settling on social
welfare, however, we have also staked a position in the heated
debate over whether losses to consumers should be offset against
gains to other groups, such as advertisers and workers. 33 Either
stance is controversial: antitrust’s fixation with consumer welfare
is partially responsible for how big tech has amassed market
power, but social welfare can be imprecise due to its attempt at
inclusiveness. Nonetheless, quantifying a producer’s effects on
total societal welfare has always been a holy grail in both antitrust
and economics. Viewing our model as a first step in that direction,
we try to strike a balance between the overly narrow consumer
welfare standard and a maximally broad conception of allocative
efficiency. However, we argue that even those who reject the total
welfare standard should embrace quantitative estimates of the
effect of remedies on certain groups.
We must also confront another basic question: in deciding
what to model, we are making assumptions that may signal
certain normative stances. More concretely, our model does not
factor in externalities such as internet addiction, political

31 See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brougth Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We
Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010). See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 2.3C
(5th ed. 2011).
32 See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox¸ 126 YALE L.J. 710, 737
(2017).
33 This was prominently addressed in Ohio v. American Express, 585 U.S., where
the Court did factor in the gains to merchants as a counter to the losses to
consumers from the credit card’s anti-steering provisions.
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polarization, encroachment on privacy, and the spread of fake
news. The omission should not suggest that these concerns are
unimportant, or impossible to model. Rather, lack of data
precludes their computation in our model. Ultimately, we hope to
nudge regulators and platform operators toward releasing their
own models of social welfare, to reveal what they value and how
they quantify it. Greater transparency on the welfare effects of
digital platforms would significantly advance the conversation
around their regulation.
Finally, our model raises interesting implications for
multisided infrastructures in other industries, such as finance and
utilities. While every industry is unique, 34 our findings suggest—
qualitatively—that interoperability is crucial to maximizing a
platform’s welfare effects. Extended to financial markets, this may
mean that back-office utilities such as clearinghouses should
allow inputs from many different exchanges—and, more
controversially, they could even settle trading activity across
more varied asset classes, as some commentators have
suggested. 35
Section II of this Article canvasses the theoretical
considerations of natural monopolies. At its core, multisided
platforms are natural monopolies that harness economies of scale
and scope. While natural monopolies are the most efficient single
providers in their markets, they can also distort competition. In
addressing those distortions as well as traditional solutions under
antitrust, we dive into the debates over antitrust’s very goals.

See Arup Bose, On the Merits of Antitrust Liability in Regulated Industries, 59 J.
L. & ECON. 359 (2016).
35 See Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty
Reduce Counterparty Risk?, 1 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 74 (2011) (netting
efficiency benefits of one giant clearinghouse). For a tongue-in-cheek proposal
of nationalization as a backstop to clearinghouse default, see Stephen J.
Lubben,
Nationalize
the
Clearinghouses!
(2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2458506&rec=1&srcab
s=2425187&alg=1&pos=7.
34
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Against this backdrop, Section III then connects Facebook to
the theoretical literature on digital platforms and natural
monopolies. The antitrust community has begun to move from its
exhaustive treatment of “platform monopoly” harms to
remedies. 36 Proper remedies are notoriously difficult in antitrust
to devise; 37 for digital platforms, proposals span heavy-handed
breakups to less intrusive interoperability mandates. 38 We
contend that quantifying the welfare effects of each intervention
is indispensable to its assessment.
To that end, the remainder of this Article introduces a model
of Facebook’s social welfare devised by Seth Benzell and Avinash
Collis. The Benzell-Collis model captures the nuances of user
demand for the social network in order to predict the
consequences of reforms such as taxes, divestitures, and user
rebates. Drawing on surveys of over 57,000 Facebook users, the
model calculates Facebook’s social welfare as the sum of four
components: (i) consumer welfare; (ii) advertising profits; (iii) tax
revenues; and (iv) the value of a large user base. Section IV
introduces the Benzell–Collis model and unveils the results when
the model is calibrated to data from Facebook. Here we also

On harms, see, e.g., See David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging
Global Internet Economy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 285, 302 (2008); Erika M.
Douglas, Monopolization Remedies and Data Privacy, 24 Va. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2020);
John M. Newman, supra note 27. On remedies, see, e.g., Herbert Hoveniamp,
Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 YALE L.J. 1952 (2021); Patel, supra note 6.
37 For instance, injunctive remedies may themselves stifle competition by
forcing rivals to share technologies and infrastructures. Philip Areeda, Essential
Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990)
(decrying essential facilities).
38 See, e.g., ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, BREAK ‘EM UP: RECOVERING OUR FREEDOM FROM
BIG AG, BIG TECH, AND BIG MONEY 12, 19, 56–57, 223–25 (2020) (breakups);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 YALE L.J. 1952 (2020)
(interoperability); Patel, supra note 6 (rescinding merger approval years
afterward); Jonathan B. Baker & Fiona Scott Morton, Antitrust Enforcement
Against Platform MFNs, 127 YALE L.J. 2176 (2018) (limiting the use of most
favored nations provisions); Morton et al., supra note 14 (interoperability).
36
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explain the calibration process while noting what the model
leaves out.
The Benzell–Collis model provides a tool to estimate changes
in social value (compared to the current welfare levels) in
response to any number of antitrust solutions to Facebook’s
dominance. Section V categorizes the proposals to curtail
dominant tech platforms and assesses their application to
Facebook. As the most extreme possibility, running the platform
at a loss, as a government-subsidized utility, might maximize
social welfare by attending to inframarginal, or committed, users.
Yet this approach is infeasible in a for-profit enterprise, which
tends to focus only on the welfare of marginal users, who are on
the fence about a product. By contrast, the worst possible
solutions are breakups that gut social welfare. Botched breakups
can be horizontal, which in our case may mean two Baby
Facebooks, or vertical, such as the forced sale of WhatsApp and
Instagram. Between these two bookends is a plethora of solutions,
each succeeding or failing in its own way.
Section V concludes. Our extension of the Benzell and Collis
model shows how courts and regulators might sift through the
possibilities for relief from Facebook. Ultimately, we hope that
our model forces regulators to confront—and also publicize—
how they quantify welfare effects upon consumers and, more
broadly, society.
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR NATURAL MONOPOLIES
Like other digital platforms, Facebook’s value derives from
its network effects—benefits conferred to a platform as it draws
more users. Significant network effects, combined with the large
fixed cost of entry to potential competitors, render Facebook a
natural monopoly—a single, gargantuan producer that serves a
market more efficiently than multiple smaller firms.39
ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS 123–24 (The MIT Press 1988) (1971).
39
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Traditionally, natural monopolies were subjected to extensive
regulation such as rate setting, but today’s regulatory climate
prefers general principles that set the ground rules for fair
competition. 40 These principles are notoriously open-ended, 41 so
their invocation in the FTC and State AG complaints may lead to
wildly divergent approaches. Worse yet, their application to
dynamic markets is rarely straightforward.
This Section lays the foundation for the treatment of Facebook
as a natural monopoly by discussing the anticompetitive
propensities of natural monopolies. Anticipating a related—and
fraught—debate on the proper remedies of naturally
monopolistic digital platforms, the Section also summarizes the
discourse on antitrust standards. This groundwork is
unavoidable: any model of social welfare must clearly and
honestly convey the goals that policy interventions are designed
to advance. The Section begins with an analysis of antitrust
standards before delving into the distortions of monopolies
generally and digital platforms specifically.
A. Debates over Antitrust Standards
Because antitrust law is underpinned by notoriously vague
sections of the Sherman and Clayton acts, 42 the field has been
beset by decades of internecine fighting over its very goals.
Famously, Robert Bork proclaimed that antitrust was “the effort
to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive
efficiency.” 43 This stance came to be associated with the Chicago
school of economics, which emphasized the positive aspects of

See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 29.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2; 15 U.S.C. § 18.
42 See, e.g., Sherman Act §§ 1, 2; Clayton Act §§ 2, 3.
43 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 3 (1993).
40
41
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monopoly such as facilitating innovation and enabling economies
of scale. 44
The inheritors of this tradition would dominate antitrust for
decades, heralding efficiency above all other goals.45 Curiously,
Bork arrived at efficiency through a sleight of hand, by advocating
initially for “consumer welfare.” 46 In Bork’s formulation,
consumer welfare encompassed the profits of monopolies and
cartels, so supracompetitive prices could be offset if dominant
firms produced more efficiently. 47 The additional profits enabled
by monopoly, if large enough, could offset a reduction in
consumers’ welfare. Over time, however, the antitrust community
came to adopt consumer welfare as the reigning standard. 48
Under this standard, judges use modern economic theory to
evaluate whether a given monopoly or action harms consumers
in the relevant market. 49 In economic theory, consumer welfare is
defined as the difference between what consumers are willing to
pay for a product and its price. Monopolies are understood to be
bad for consumers insofar as they make this difference smaller,
See JONATHAN B. BAKER’S THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY (2019); William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of
Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard
Double-Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1; Lanny Ebenstein, The Increasingly
Libertarian Milton Friedman: An Ideological Profile, 11 ECON. J. WATCH 81, 95
(2014).
45 Even the Harvard school, which rose as an answer, adopted many of the
same methods. See Kovacic, supra note 44.
46 The rest of the quote above reads. . . “the effort to improve allocative
efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no
gain or a net loss in consumer welfare.” BORK, supra note 43, at 3.
47 Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 2, at 199.
48 See Barak Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 133 (2011); Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and
the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 480 (2012).
49 See, e.g., Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (“To
determine whether a restraint violates the rule of reason . . . a three-step
burden-shifting framework applies . . . [where] the plaintiff has the initial
burden to prove that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive
effect that harms consumers in the relevant market. . .”).
44

DRAFT

2022]

3/7/2022 2:39 PM

FACEBOOK, WELFARE, & NATURAL MONOPOLY

15

leading some consumers to buy the product at a higher price 50
and others to forgo buying the product at all. 51
Recently, scholars have disputed that consumer welfare
should be the only or main antitrust standard. Some claim that the
reliance on economic theory to determine harms gives too much
of an advantage to powerful monopolists, who can hire the most
expensive experts, and argue for more reliance on bright per se
lines. 52 Others, such as former FTC Chair Christine S. Wilson,
argue that the consumer welfare should be replaced or
supplemented with a total welfare standard. 53 The total welfare
standard would add the surplus of firms in the relevant market to
those of consumers. 54 In other words, if a certain action raised the
total profits of all relevant firms (including the platform
monopolist) by more than it decreased consumer welfare, the total
welfare standard would see it as acceptable. Because wealth, a
major type of which is business equity, is more unequal than
consumption, 55 a total welfare standard would typically be more
50 Leaving them less resources to purchase other things they like, or forcing
them to work longer hours than they’d like to, either of which would reduce
their welfare as understood by economists
51 This leaves some consumers fewer resources to make desired purchases and
forces others to work more than otherwise preferred. Both options reduce
consumer welfare. See Christine S. Wilson, FTC Comm’ner, Welfare Standards
Underlying Antitrust Enforcement: What You Measure is What You Get, Keynote at
George Mason Law Review 22nd Annual Antitrust Symposium, at 5 (2019),
transcript
available
at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1455663/
welfare_standard_speech_-_cmr-wilson.pdf.
52 See Khan, supra note 32.
53 See Wilson, supra note 51, at 18. See also BORK, supra note 43, at 3.
54 Typically firm a firm’s surplus is equal to their profits, but some firms may
have goals other than maximizing profits. We discuss Facebook’s potential
non-immediate revenue-maximizing goals in Section IV infra.
55 Wealth in the US is highly unequal, with 34.9% of US wealth held by the top
1%. Consumption in the US is much more equal, with 38% of expenditures
made by the top 10% of households in 2020. See Thomas Piketty et al.,
Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133
Q. J. ECON. 553 (2017); Drew Silver, The Many Ways to Measure Economic
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beneficial to the rich than a consumer welfare standard.
Nonetheless, Wilson argues that dividing surplus is a role for
Congress or other agencies, and the FTC and antitrust law should
consider the total welfare standard “which would maximize
efficiency and give those who wish to engage in redistribution a
larger pie to share.”56 Other scholars advocate for a mixed
approach, where judges may take into account multiple interests
including but not limited to consumer and producer surplus. 57
Whatever standard is ultimately applied in the Facebook
antitrust complaint, designing remedies requires understanding
the nature, distribution, and magnitude of the harm created by
the platform’s market power.
B. How Monopolies Distort Competition
In a perfectly competitive market, every good is priced at its
marginal cost of production. 58 Such a market guarantees a Paretoefficient distribution of resources, in which no individual can be
better off without making another individual worse off. 59 The fact
Inequality,
PEW
RESEARCH
CENTER
(Sept.
22,
2015),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/22/the-many-ways-tomeasure-economic-inequality/; Robert Gebeloff, Who Owns Stocks? Explaining
the Rise in Inequality during the Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/upshot/stocks-pandemicinequality.html.
56 Wilson, supra note 51, at 18.
57 Such considerations might include “preserving a deconcentrated industry
structure, dispersing economic power, and promoting fairness in economic
dealings.” Id. at 9.
58 See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY, Vol. 1, at 318
(1995) (seminal macroeconomics textbook discussing perfectly competitive
versus monopolized markets). In a competitive market, firms are “price takers”
who have no control over the price of what they sell. Accordingly, the profitmaximizing strategy is to produce more of the good until the price of the good
equals its marginal cost. This is the opposite of wielding market power.
59 Id. at Ch. 16. Pareto efficiency has several limitations. Notably, an economy
that is extremely unequal may still be efficient in Pareto’s sense. Therefore, this
state has come under attack as a desideratum for policymakers.
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that, under a set of technical assumptions, 60 competitive markets
are guaranteed to produce a Pareto-efficient result is enshrined in
the “first fundamental theorem” of welfare economics. 61 Notably,
the assumptions underpinning this theorem are unlikely to hold
when production technologies with high fixed costs and strong
demand and supply side economies of scale (e.g., network effects)
are in place, leading to only one or a few dominant firms. This is
the instance of a natural monopoly or winner-take-all market.62
Monopolies depress social welfare by creating artificial
scarcity of goods in the monopolized markets. This scarcity raises
the price of goods above their marginal cost. For the monopolist,
the difference between actual price and marginal cost (as well as
between quantities of goods produced in a monopoly versus a
perfectly competitive market) represents a profitable exchange.
However, monopoly profits come at the expense of consumers,
who now face a shortage of goods and a surplus of prices—a
notion known as “deadweight loss.” 63
If a monopolist wants to sell more product, it must lower its
prices. 64 While on the margin it may be profitable for the
monopolist to make an additional unit and sell it just above
marginal cost, it cannot do so without reducing its inframarginal
profit.65 If a monopolist could perfectly price discriminate (that is,
The most important being local non-satiation of preferences—i.e., the notion
that life for every agent in an economy can improve by they are conferred more
resources. This is a relatively non-onerous assumption relative to the
assumption of perfect price-taking behavior.
61 Id.
62 See id. at 570 (“Large nonconvexities caused by the presence of fixed costs or
extensive increasing returns lead to a world of a small number of large firms
(in the limit, production efficiency may require a single firm, a so-called
‘natural monopoly’), making the assumption of price taking less plausible.”).
63 Id. at 385. Deadweight loss from monopoly can be calculated as the difference
in the Marshallian aggregate surplus between the competitive and
monopolized states of the world.
64 Id.
65 I.e., the profit a monopolist makes on goods that it would sell whether or not
it attempts to manipulate prices.
60
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charge different prices to different consumers) 66 there would be
no reduction in social efficiency. Yet this would incur a problem
with equity, with the monopolist would gaining all the surplus
and consumers gaining nothing.
Hence, monopolies are a social ill for at least two reasons.
First, they capture a larger share of the fruits of society than might
be considered equitable. Second, and more importantly, they
shrink the size of the social pie. 67 To the extent the firm can price
discriminate, it exacerbates the first problem but softens the latter.
Beyond this classic list of economic distortions, we can also tack
on sociopolitical criticisms of monopolies such as
overconcentration of economic, and therefore political, power as
a failure in and of itself. 68
To rein in the economic and sociopolitical distortions of
monopolies, antitrust devised a slew of interventions that, over
time, have become more nuanced. The blanket prohibition on
“combinations” and “restraints of trade” softened over time.69
This evolution came in part because the focus on consumer
welfare directed courts and regulators to inquire whether alleged
practices harmed consumers; if not, then those practices tended to
survive challenge, even if they engendered other harms, such as
to labor or the competitive process. Further, economists have even
Perfect price discrimination entails charging every user with a private
valuation of the good less than the marginal cost of producing their exact
private value. Note that price discrimination is only possible when a firm has
market power; otherwise, another firm would enter with lower costs and
compete down the price to all customers down to the marginal cost of
production. See id. at 387 (“if the monopolist were able to perfectly discriminate
among its customers in the sense that it could make a distinct offer to each
consumer, knowing the consumer’s preferences for its product, then the
monopoly quantity distortion would disappear”).
67 That said, the Sherman and Clayton act also ban “unreasonably low” prices
and price predation, which are designed to destroy competition and enable
monopolistically high prices in the future.
68 See Barak Orbach, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2012).
69 Compare, e.g., U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Organization, Brown Shoe, and
Alcoa,
66
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proposed caveats to the traditional condemnation of monopolies.
Unifying these disparate approaches, economists nevertheless
concluded that at least two situations may benefit from
regulation: natural monopolies and products which constitute a
social ill (e.g., polluting or addictive products).
C. Challenges to Regulating Digital Platform Monopolies
Apart from exhibiting traits of natural monopolies, digital
platforms also implicate the dynamism and challenges of
multisided platforms. The theory of multisided platforms
originates from two important insights dating to the 1970s. First,
Metcalfe’s Law notes that if the value of a connection on a
platform is constant, then the total value of all connections on a
platform grows with the square of the number of participants. 70
This means that the value of platforms increases rapidly as the
number of participants on the platform grows. With two users of
a platform, there is only one possible connection; with three users,
there are three possible connections. Four users produce six
possible connections; and five users, ten connections. A platform
with N users has N*(N – 1)/2 possible connections. 71 Metcalfe’s
Law contained the kernel of what would become the fundamental
challenge in digital platform regulation: From a social
perspective, we want the platform to be as large as possible;
however, if platform profits are linear in relation to the number of
users, the platform’s operator may be incentivized to restrict the
platform to a smaller size than socially optimal.
Another important early contribution came from Jeffrey
Rholfs, who defined the concept of a recursive network
equilibrium, one in which every user’s participation on a platform
is a function of everyone else’s expected participation. 72 Professor

See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES (1999).
Id.
72 Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service,
5 BELL J. ECON. 16 (1974).
70
71
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Rholfs noted that some equilibria are stable while others are
unstable. An equilibrium is stable when small changes in prices
or participation garner small changes in equilibrium
participation. By contrast, in an unstable equilibrium, a platform
is balanced on a knife’s edge—the departure of a single user could
cause a chain reaction of lowered platform quality and other user
departures that completely erodes platform participation. 73
Subsequently, the Nobel Laureate Jean Tirole, 74 alongside
Marshall Van Alstyne, Geoffrey Parker, Jean-Charles Rochet,
Marc Rysman, Andrei Hagiu, and others, would develop the
theory of “two-sided platforms.” 75 In a two-sided platform,
participation on one side of the platform creates spillover effects
on the other side. Classic examples of two-sided markets are
credit cards (which require both vendors and card-users to
adopt), online search (which requires users to provide data and
eyeballs and advertisers to provide revenue), and desktop
computer operating systems (which require developers to make
and sell applications and consumers to purchase and use them). 76
One key insight of this literature is that platforms must pricediscriminate across sides to maximize platform value. In
particular, platforms should charge higher prices to the side with
less positive network effects and lower prices to the side with
more elastic demand. For credit cards, this means charging
vendors (whose demand usage tends to be inelastic because they
need to accept many cards to be competitive) and subsidizing
consumers (whose usage tends to be highly elastic because any
consumer only needs a single card). Extended to the online search
context, a platform would charge advertisers (who create negative
network effects for users) and provide free search results for users
Id.
Key to his prize was the seminal article Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole,
Platform Competition in Two-sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003).
75 Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 125
(2009).
76 For an interesting take on operating systems, see NEAL STEPHENSON, IN THE
BEGINNING . . . WAS THE COMMAND LINE (1999).
73
74
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(who provide positive network effects by creating data to improve
products and services). 77
Because platforms harbor an incentive to charge more for
users who provide negative network effects than users who
provide positive network effects, their monopolists might
maximize social welfare more effectively than a competitive
market. In a competitive market, for example, no firm has an
incentive to subsidize users whose positive network effects
mostly benefit people not on the platform. Glen Weyl, in the first
paper to develop a solution for a version of the multisided
platform problem, shows that a monopoly platform’s interests are
not entirely misaligned with society’s. 78 Weyl’s model was
extended by Julian Wright and Hongru Tan, who classified
distortions from monopolist platforms versus social welfare
maximization. 79 For example, in addition to the distortion from
ignoring the welfare of inframarginal users, Professors Wright
and Tan identify a potential “eternal September” effect, whereby,
as the internet grows, the average quality and tone of discourse
on the internet worsened. 80 They point out that if earnest users of
platforms are more likely to use the platform and trolls are more
loosely attached, then larger platforms are likely to have more
users with utility-destroying network effects.
III. FACEBOOK AS NATURAL MONOPOLY

See, e.g., Andrei Hagiu, Strategic Decisions for Multisided Platforms, MIT SLOAN
MGMT. REV. (Dec. 19, 2013), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/strategicdecisions-for-multisided-platforms/.
78 E. Glen Weyl, A Price Theory of Multi-sided Platforms, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1642
(2010).
79 Hongru Tan & Julian Wright, Pricing Distortions in Multi-sided Platforms, 79
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 102732 (2021).
80 WENDY M. GROSSMAN, THE YEAR SEPTEMBER NEVER ENDED 4–17 (2006).
77
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Meta, as the U.S.’s most dominant social media company
today,81 poses special challenges to legal and economic analyses
of harms. Like other media companies, Facebook provides
services at zero monetary cost to consumers, subverting the
traditional argument that monopolies restrict consumer surplus
by charging supracompetitive prices. 82 Second, like other digital
platforms, Facebook exhibits the traits of a natural monopoly,
including high barriers to entry, low marginal costs, and strong
network effects. As the prior Section explores, a natural monopoly
is a dominant firm in a market where the equilibrium number of
providers is one. 83 This definition suggests that welfare might be
best served by avoiding a breakup or shrinking of Facebook.
Finally, Facebook may engender a set of social ills that are not
covered in traditional measures of consumer surplus. The
platform has been charged, for instance, with subverting
democracy, polarizing the political discourse, 84 and augmenting
addictive behavior and its psychological effects. 85 To the extent
that the platform’s services constitute a “public evil” rather than
a “public good,” any remedy that enhances Facebook usage and
quality may in turn impair social welfare.
This Section explores the nuances of the claim that Facebook
is abusing its market power to the detriment of consumers and
society. This claim requires parsing the platform’s natural
monopoly features, such as its network effects and strategies to
maintain a large user base. Accordingly, this Section begins by
analyzing the purposes and consequences of that large user base
before moving onto the distortions from its network effects.
Statistica Research Dept., U.S. market share of leading social media websites 2021
(Jan. 28, 2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/265773/market-share-ofthe-most-popular-social-media-websites-in-the-us/.
82 John M. Newman, supra note 27.
83 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS 123-24 (MIT Press 1988) (1971).
84 See Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 1969.
85 James Niels Rosenquist et al., Addictive Technology and its Implications for
Antitrust Enforcement (2020) (manuscript on file with author).
81
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A. Tactics and Fallout from Achieving a Large User Base
For any multisided platform, attaining and maintaining a
user base is a central goal. Most importantly, a large user base can
be monetized by advertisements or fees. Additionally, even users
who are not directly monetized may create a positive network
effect induces other, profitable, users to use the platform. Yet a
platform’s operator may value a large user base for several
reasons beyond the users’ direct contribution to profits. This
complicates the total welfare standard because these nonpecuniary motivations may fall into two categories: procompetitive and anticompetitive.86
One benign motivation for a large user base is that it may
enable data collection for analysis that will lead to new or better
products. Alternatively, or additionally, a large user base may
create opportunities for profiting off future products. For Meta,
the latter motivation may derive from the desire to maximize sales
of Libra digital currencies as well as Metaverse and Oculus VR
services. This motivation is analogous to investing in future
products and should be viewed positively (to the extent these
future projects are themselves socially positive).
On the other hand, a large user base may be pursued for
anticompetitive reasons. A platform may cultivate a large user
base by keeping prices artificially low (or quality artificially high)
to deter the entry of competitors or to fend off regulators. 87 In
either view, Facebook’s courtship of a large user base at the
expense of profits is a sign that the threat of entry (or regulation)
Benzell & Collis, supra note 9.
This tactic is a variation of predatory pricing—i.e., suppressing prices in the
short term to drive competitors out of business, so as to raise prices afterward.
See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
Given the short-term benefits to consumers, the Supreme Court has viewed
price squeezing claims skeptically. See C. Scott Hemphill & Philip J. Weiser,
Beyond Brooke Group: Bringing Reality to the Law of Predatory Pricing, 127 YALE
L.J. 204 (2018).
86
87
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induces its actions. Neither strategy renders the platform’s low
level of advertising harmful, though it suggests that an even more
socially beneficial outcome might arise if not for the
anticompetitive pricing (e.g., a more competitive or differently
regulated social media industry). 88
Finally, a large user base might be cultivated to prevent the
network from “unraveling.” Unraveling is the process by which a
shock to a platform or market leads to increasingly larger cascades
of user departures. 89 A network in an unstable equilibrium is
closer to this result. In essence, this is the opposite process of the
positively reinforcing network effects driving the growth of large
platforms. Instead of additional users reinforcing the network and
one another’s value, a steady withdrawal of users leads to a run
on the platform. Such a cascade could hypothetically be triggered
by even a moderate departure of users. We can assume, then, that
Facebook has estimated its point of collapse once its user base falls
below a critical threshold, and might speculate, further, that the
platform has built up many more users than that threshold to
serve as a buffer. Whether strategies to prevent unraveling are
anticompetitive is unclear. Although some scholars have argued
that staving off unraveling is Pareto-efficient, a more competitive
or socially beneficial industry could emerge from the ashes of a
fallen dominant platform. 90
A platform can utilize many tools to attain a large user base.
It may invest (or not invest) in new products or features.
Alternatively, it may reduce or increase the intensity with which
it monetizes customers by altering fees, the level of advertising,
or amount of data sold to third parties.91 The Benzell-Collis model
See, e.g., Schor v. Abbott Labs., 457 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[I]f a
manufacturer cannot make itself better off by injuring consumers through
lower output and higher prices, there is no role for antitrust law to play.”).
89 Benzell & Collis, supra note 9, at 25.
90 Hanna Hałaburda, Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of
preferences, 69 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 365 (2010).
91 Andre Veiga et al., Multidimensional Platform Design, 107 Am. Econ. Rev. 191
(2017).
88
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assumes that Facebook maximizes twin goals—maximizing profit
while maintaining a large user base. It assumes that the platform
pursues these goals efficiently, making optimal, cost-minimizing
tradeoffs among monetization and product quality tactics. More
concretely, the company sets the average expected revenue per
user and adheres to an efficient mix of investments,
disinvestments, and advertising to realize that revenue. 92
One of the core schemes deployed by platforms to maximize
revenue is price discrimination—assigning different levels of
monetization to different constituents. Conceptually, if a platform
were to be able to perfectly price-discriminate (i.e., charge each
user exactly their opportunity cost for participating), it would
arrive at an equilibrium where the deadweight loss from
monopoly is zero. 93
Of course, a large user base might entail social costs—and
even social benefits—that are not factored into consumer welfare
or producer profits. For example, social media may spread fake
news and foment political polarization. 94 Advertisements, too,
dampen consumer welfare, though they may also help consumers
find new products and increase the efficiency of the economy
overall. 95 Finally, Facebook usage might spur private negative
effects not captured in traditional measures of consumer surplus,

Benzell & Collis, supra note 9.
ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL, supra note 58, at 387 (“If the monopolist were
able to perfectly discriminate among its customers in the sense that it could
make a distinct offer to each consumer, knowing the consumer’s preferences
for its product, then the monopoly quantity distortion would disappear; such
an outcome would be acceptable from a total welfare standard standpoint, and
unacceptable to a consumer welfare standard. This equilibrium is Kaldor-Hicks
efficient, even though the platform’s stockholders are the sole beneficiaries of
this efficiency.”).
94 See Section IV.B infra. Applied to the context of platform modelling, we note
that we cannot determine how precisely and successfully Facebook can pricediscriminate, so the model presumes that Facebook showers all users with the
same frequency of advertising.
95 See Section IV.B infra.
92
93
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such as erosion of consumer privacy. 96 In the extreme, Facebook
usage may constitute an addictive activity, which would present
a major caveat to any correlation between social welfare and
consumer demand. 97
B. Modeling Network Effects
In modeling any digital platform, the primary agents are the
potential users. At any given moment, potential users must decide
whether to engage with the platform. Individuals are subjective
utility-maximizers and will engage with the platform only when
their expected value from doing so (after accounting for any fees
or disutility from advertisements or data harvesting) is greater
than their opportunity costs. For Facebook, those opportunity
costs are the next-best alternatives for spending their time.
The distribution of opportunity costs across any population
determines how sensitive platform participation is to fluctuations
in the platform’s price or quality.98 For example, if the population
is bifurcated into (i) a group that will use the platform no matter
what and (ii) a group that will never use the platform at all, ebbs
in the price of an intermediately priced platform will do little to
alter the level of platform participation. On the other hand, if a
large segment of the population is ambivalent about the platform,
then an ebb in price can significantly affect platform participation.
This elasticity will be even greater in the long run if network
effects on the platform are strong.
Network effects differentiate platforms from other
enterprises. With network effects, one user on the platform
changes the value of the platform to other users. For the most
successful platforms, network effects are strong and positive.
Further, a platform can attract user bases that interact with the
platform in different ways. A ride-sharing platform, for instance,
96
97
98

Douglas, supra note 36.
Rosenquist et al., supra note 85.
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counts both potential drivers and potential riders as its user base.
In modeling Uber or Lyft, then, we might distinguish between
potential riders and drivers who live in different cities, prefer
different vehicles, or any other relevant characteristics. Each of
these populations can be thought of as a “side” of the platform, in
the sense that the sides are heterogeneous in the network effects
they give and receive. If a platform has only one “side,” or if its
sides do not produce network effects (e.g., because one user’s
participation does not directly depend on any other users’
decision to participate), the model reduces to a standard
monopoly, with all its attendant antitrust implications.
Translated to a model, every side of a platform creates and
receives a potentially unique set of network effects. 99 In the
hypothetical of a ride-sharing platform, we might distinguish
between drivers (who benefit from numerous riders but ceteris
paribus prefer fewer drivers to compete with) and riders (who
benefit from numerous drivers but prefer fewer riders). For
greater precision, we might distinguish the geographic markets of
potential riders and drivers, increasing the number of sides
modeled from two to the number of cities considered.
Each side can be distinguished further by its unique
distribution of opportunity costs. The elasticity of some groups to
changes in platform quality may be high (this might include
young people who are all relatively blasé about Facebook), while
for other groups it may be low (older, devoted users may stay on
the platform even after large quality shocks, while other older
individuals might be technology-resistant and refrain from use no
matter what changes Facebook makes). In addition, the average
opportunity cost for some groups may be high or low. If a group
with strong positive network effects has a large opportunity cost
of using the platform (for example, celebrities), then this group of
“superstars” might become the target of efforts by the platform to
induce their usage. Overall, platforms will decrease monetization

99

Benzell & Collis, supra note 9.
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on groups that have high elasticities of demand and create large
network effects, and vice versa.
C. Social Media and Natural Monopoly
Strong network effects, which can be understood as a
demand-side economy of scale (i.e., product quality increases as a
good or service is more widely used), 100 are perhaps the most
important reason social media is considered a “winner-take-all”
market.101 In such a market, the long-term equilibrium number of
sellers is one. 102 The low marginal cost of providing social media
services, coupled with high fixed costs of creating the code and
user base, tends to reduce competition in the market. Winnertake-all, or winner-take-most, markets therefore tend to produce
large firms with market power.103
The successful firm in a winner-take-all market is a natural
monopoly, a term with two closely connected but independent
meanings. First, a single firm is the most efficient outcome under
a total welfare standard. Second, a natural monopoly is the
equilibrium outcome of its market in the absence of any
anticompetitive behavior. The value created by a digital platform
arises in part because of transaction costs: without transaction

Marshall W. Van Alstyne, Pipelines, Platforms, and the New Rules of Strategy,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2020), https://hbr.org/2016/04/pipelines-platformsand-the-new-rules-of-strategy
101 See Daniel A. Hanley, A Topology of Multisided Digital Platforms, 19 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 271 (2020); Thomas R. Eisenmann, Winner-Take-All in Networked
Markets, HARV. BUS. SCH. 1 (Sept. 11, 2007) (discussing online auction sites). For
a fuller discussion of the scholarship on this point, see Hovenkamp, supra note
38, at 1970 n.67.
102 Id. at 1969 (“A ‘winner-take-all’ market is one in which the equilibrium
number of sellers at any time is one.”).
103 ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL, supra note 58, at 570 (“Large nonconvexities
caused by the presence of fixed costs or extensive increasing returns lead to a
world of a small number of large firms (in the limit, production efficiency may
require a single firm, a so-called ‘natural monopoly’), making the assumption
of price taking less plausible.”).
100
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costs, users could interact with one another directly at their
bargained-for pricing and terms. Given the high transaction costs
of all such interactions in a market, a platform emerges to enable
these connections. In doing so, the platform boosts social value by
subsidizing the more elastic sides of the market—which the
inelastic sides may be unable to directly pay.
Historically, natural monopolies were subjected to intrusive
rate regulation. 104 A classic example is electrical utilities, which
has two constituent markets—power transmission and power
generation. The former is clearly a winner-take-all market bearing
high sunk costs, 105 while electricity generation is usually seen as a
competitive market. Due to complementarities between the two
markets, the same firm often controls both power generation and
power transmission. In the mold of utility-style regulation, when
a local government embarks on electrifying an area, it solicits bids
from firms to provide both generation and transmission. As part
of the final agreement, the firm agrees to supply electricity to all
consumers in the area at a set price, often determined as a fixed
markup above costs. 106 This regulatory paradigm reflects
tradeoffs about the relative inefficiencies of government
intervention and cleaving generation from transmission. 107
Arguably, in opening up bids for electrification, competition for
the market may be sufficient to keep monopolists in check—even

Kearney & Merrill, supra note 29.
More concretely, it is simply too wasteful to affix more than one set of
electricity transmission cables to any building or dwelling.
106See, Paul L. Joskow, Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the
U.S. Electricity Sector, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 119 (1997).
107 Id. at __ (“vertical integration between the network functions that have
natural monopoly characteristics and the generation function effectively turns
the supply of generating service into a monopoly as well, even if, as is the case
in the United States, there are numerous generating plants connected to the
network and limited economies of scale associated with generation per se in
isolation from the coordination functions performed by the network “).
104
105

DRAFT

3/7/2022 2:39 PM

30

if, as a result of natural monopoly, there is no competition within
the market.108
Recently, Herbert Hovenkamp, widely regarded as the
“dean” of modern antitrust,109 has challenged the notion that
social media platform markets are winner-take-all. Professor
Hovenkamp arrives at this conclusion after evaluating five factors
determining the existence of a natural monopoly: (1) the lack of
stable competition or multi-homing among incumbents; (2) the
durability of dominance and the ability to resist technological
change; (3) declining costs or network effects relating to singlefirm control; (4) the lack of significant product differentiation; and
(5) the lack of interoperability or data sharing. 110 In our view, it is
debatable whether these are the right criteria to determine if a
market is winner-take-all—and whether these criteria are
applicable to Facebook. Condition 1 is clearly the most important;
by this standard, the market for social media services in the U.S.
is certainly winner-take-most. 111 The smaller firms that compete
with Facebook generally do so not by creating “Facebook clones”
but, rather, abide by significantly different social mechanics or
otherwise differentiate themselves via different quality and
moderation decisions. 112 In evaluating condition 4, the existence
of the smaller also-rans may be evidence that they are pursuing
Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 57-60 (1968). In
the case of Facebook, it too can be argued that they face competition for the
market, and this keeps their monetization levels lower than would be the case
in the absence of it. We discuss the origin of Facebook’s seeming value from
maintaining a large user base, and the implications for antitrust in Section III.A.
supra.
109 NICOLAS CHARBIT & SÉBASTIEN GACHOT (EDS.), HERBERT HOVENKAMP LIBER
AMICORUM: THE DEAN OF AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW (2021).
110 Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 1972.
111
May 2021, Facebook wielded 71.8% of the U.S. social media market, measured by
visits, with another 3.28% for Instagram. See Statistica Research Dept., supra note 83.
112
Examples of social media services that pursue other approaches are Pinterest,
Twitter and Reddit (12.4%, 9.15%, and 0.76% of the market, respectively). Examples
of social media services who take different stances on content regulation include
Gettr, Parler, Gab, and otaku image boards, which are generally more permissive than
the large platforms.
108
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substantially different markets 113 or, alternatively, that product
differentiation does permit for stable competition. 114 As for
condition 3, social media is as strong a winner-take-all market as
can be imagined, with extremely strong positive network effects
and low marginal costs. Finally, at this point we do not have a
sufficient time period to fully evaluate condition 2, but condition
5 also renders the current market more winner-take-all, as there is
currently very limited interoperability between Facebook and
other platforms.
Should regulation change the landscape, the market would
certainly become more competitive—and indeed, in Section V we
consider the possible remedies. Nonetheless, in evaluating
markets on a continuum, the market for social media is much
more “winner-take-most” than most markets. This further
suggests that remedies for Facebook’s market power may do
better by avoiding breakups that would destroy the network
effects and increase marginal costs.
IV. APPLYING THE BENZELL–COLLIS MODEL TO FACEBOOK
In prior work, Benzell and Collis developed a quantitative
model of consumer participation on and value from “Facebook
Blue,” Meta’s core social media platform. 115 The model builds on
the frameworks of Weyl, Wright, and Tan, who rely on a
theoretical device known as an “insulating tariff” to allow the
platform to choose any equilibrium it desires. This artifice also
requires complete information about the setting to implement. By
contrast, the Benzell and Collis approach is local, requiring only

113

For instance, it is unclear whether Reddit and Facebook are substitutes for one
another. According to the condition 1, the winner-take-all-ness of social media is
currently even more extreme.
114
This could then be a basis to challenge Facebook’s dominance and thereby make
the market seem less winner-take-all under condition 4.
115 See Benzell & Collis, supra note 9. The term “Facebook Blue” distinguishes
the Facebook social media platform from other social media platforms owned
by the Facebook corporation, including Instagram and WhatsApp.
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information about platform demand in the vicinity of the
currently realized equilibrium. The calibrated model predicts the
fallout from a shock to the platform equilibrium such as a change
in prices, rather than selecting the global maximum directly.
More importantly, the Benzell-Collis model is designed for
practical application to real-world data. Drawing on surveys of
Facebook users, the model captures the nuances of user demand
for the social network to predict the consequences of reforms such
as taxes, divestitures, and user rebates. These results highlight
areas where clarity would be particularly helpful—Facebook’s
externalities, its returns to connections, and its ability to price
discriminate.
This Section introduces the model and applies it to Facebook.
It how data can be collected to calibrate the model to estimate the
harm caused by Facebook’s market power. The Section begins by
dissecting the four components of social welfare in the model.
Then it analyzes the two main groups of agents whose
interactions are relevant to the model: the platform and its users
platform.
A. Components of Social Welfare
The Benzell-Collis model has four components, each
incorporating how Facebook and, more broadly, social media
contribute to social welfare.
1. Consumer Welfare
The first and most obvious component of social welfare is
consumer welfare, which should be captured in any welfare
analysis. We measure consumer welfare as the difference between
(i) users’ willingness to pay for Facebook (under various
scenarios) and (ii) the actual price of Facebook (free) for all those
who use the platform. The distribution of willingness-to-pay
across all users is the platform’s demand function, so consumer
welfare is the area between the demand curve and price.
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2. Corporate Profits
Facebook contributes to social welfare by paying dividends
(or creating capital gains) to shareholders and taxes to the
government. While these two factors are usually omitted in the
current, consumer-welfare-centric iteration of antitrust, they
should nonetheless be incorporated into social welfare analysis.
This coheres with the income-production national accounting
identity, according to which total national production must equal
total national income. Income paid through taxes or dividends
counts just as much as wages paid to workers, even if for
egalitarian reasons we might prefer for others to be collecting the
surplus.
For a comprehensive picture of social welfare, then, our
formula also accounts for Meta’s after-tax profits. Here the model
focuses on profits from advertising, which comprise 98% of
Facebook Blue’s profits.
3. Tax Revenue
Consistent with the insight that Facebook enhances welfare
by paying dividends and taxes, the Benzell-Collis model includes
taxes paid to the government.
4. Maintaining a Large User Base
Finally, the model folds in Facebook’s “shadow value” for
maintaining a large user base. This corresponds to Facebook’s
non-pecuniary value from having lots of users. This value might
be socially positive if, for example, it represents an intangible
asset being developed from users’ data that will allow Facebook
to create new, socially positive business lines in the future. These
types of investments and intangible capital accumulation should
be counted as positive social contributions. On the other hand,
Facebook’s motivation for maintaining a larger user base than
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necessary for short-term profit maximization implies a darker
motivation—under-pricing to discourage entry and competition.
In the remainder of this Article, we focus on the positive
interpretation of this shadow value.
B. Data on Platform–User Interactions
Our model envisions interactions between two primary
constituents: the platform monopolist and its potential users. Each
of these agents pursues its distinct set of goals. The platform
monopolist seeks to balance profit maximization with user base
cultivation, even if the latter does not directly generate profits.
Facebook generates profits primarily through advertising, but like
many digital platforms, it prioritizes a large user base enough to
operate at losses for long stretches. The model was constructed for
multisided scenarios; its primary limitation is the practical
constraint of collecting relevant data for all sides. This constraint
becomes more daunting as the sides are defined with increasing
precision.
Applied to Facebook Blue, the platform monopolist is
Facebook, and the potential user base is defined as the population
of the United States. While we could model the entire U.S.
population as a homogeneous group with indistinguishable
network effects and opportunity costs, we have opted for greater
nuance by dividing the national population into twelve clusters
by age and gender. 116
For each demographic cluster the model requires estimates of
the network effects received from every other group, disutility
from advertising, and the group’s distribution of opportunity
Demographic categorization is not first-best. Rather, it is better to follow the
practice of the platforms themselves, which categorize users based on social
class and personality type in addition to basic demographics. This was the
strategy controversially implemented by Cambridge Analytica during the 2016
election—a strategy increasingly deployed by marketers using big data
machine learning techniques. We divide populations by demographics because
of the convenience of collecting this information using Google Surveys.
116
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costs. To collect this information, we conducted a series of surveys
through the Google Surveys platform of a representative sample
of the U.S. population. The most common questions we asked
were of the form “Would give up Facebook for 1 month in
exchange for $[X]? Choose Yes if you do not use Facebook.” These
questions take the form of a “Willingness to Accept” experiment,
which is a common approach for ascertaining the value
consumers receive from free digital goods. 117 We also asked
questions soliciting the specific value of connections to friends in
different demographic groups, the share of friends of different
demographic groups, and the disutility from advertisements.
Soliciting this information through simple surveys is not
ideal. Facebook itself would have the ability to measure these
quantities much more precisely, either because they already have
the data or through running simple small-scale experiments.
However, we were able to independently confirm several of our
survey findings. First, while our surveys were not “incentive
compatible” (i.e., we did not test to see whether those surveyed
would actually carry out the deals they agreed to hypothetically),
our results on the average and median value that that U.S. users
receive from Facebook are largely consistent with a study
conducted with this feature. 118 Second, while they refrained from
providing more comprehensive data, Meta gave us information
on the share of friends to and from each demographic group by
demographic group. Our survey responses on this answer
correspond well with those provided by Meta.
We also needed to collect data on Facebook itself. From
Facebook’s quarterly reports we gathered data on Facebook’s
average profit per U.S. user per month ($11.62), and the relative
amounts it raises from showing advertisements to different
demographic groups. Using this information from Facebook’s ad
Erik Brynjolfsson et al., Using Massive Online Choice Experiments to Measure
Changes in Well-Being, 116 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 7250 (2019).
118 Hunt Allcott et al., The Welfare Effects of Social Media, 110 AM. ECON. REV. 629
(2020).
117
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API (which tells us the relative cost to advertisers to advertise to
different groups) we are able to estimate the amount of revenue
generated by Facebook from individuals of different groups.119
We combine this with our survey data on individual’s disutility
from advertisements on Facebook to measure the trade-off that
Facebook faces between higher revenue and lower Facebook
quality. 120 Finally, we collected data from the U.S. Census on the
population of the U.S. by demographic group.
Once the model is fed in its key inputs, we estimate one more
parameter of the agents’ utility functions—specifically, the
platform’s motivation to maintain a large user base, over and
above the profits from those users. To calculate this, we choose
this value such that the platform’s current pricing scheme is
rationalizable as their objective maximizing choice. The way that
we calculate whether a platform would like to change its
monetization level (i.e., quality-revenue trade off) for some subset
of its users is the way that we simulate all scenarios in the model.
C. Model Calibration and Welfare Measurements
In this section, we first describe an approach to measuring
consumer demand, network effects, and other parameters needed
to calibrate a model of Facebook. We then proceed to a discussion
of various unpriced consequences of Facebook usage that may
also be relevant to an evaluation of anti-trust remedies.

Advertising revenues were 98.2% of total Facebook revenuesm according to
GAAP accounting rules in 2020. FACEBOOK (Jan. 27, 2021); FACEBOOK, Facebook
Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2020 Results (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-releasedetails/2021/Facebook-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2020Results/default.aspx.
120 While Facebook has other potential methods for changing platform quality
at the cost of less profit per user— for example by increasing moderation— by
assuming cost minimization, we focus on just one dimension of the tradeoff
Facebook faces, as at the margin Facebook will choose the same cost-benefit
ratio on all dimensions of their quality-price tradeoff.
119
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1. Calibration with Online Choice Experiments
Measuring demand for, and welfare contributions of, digital
goods presents special challenges. Digital goods are often offered
free to consumers, 121 but traditional techniques for measuring
consumer demand and welfare rely on variations in demand as
prices fluctuate. 122 Consequently, welfare gains from digital
goods are not properly captured in standard macroeconomic
measures such as GDP and productivity. 123 According to official
statistics, the size of the information sector has remained stable at
around 4-5% of national GDP over the last 40 years. Over this
period, however, common sense insists that information
technology has grown in social and economic importance. 124 The
All major search engines (Google, Bing), social media platforms (Facebook,
Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, LinkedIn), instant messaging apps (WhatsApp),
and email services (Gmail) are free to consumers. See also Newman, supra note
27.
122 A common tool for measuring demand curves is the influential “BLP”
method, named after the following source: S. Berry et al., Automobile Prices in
Market Equilibrium, ECONOMETRICA: J. ECONOMETR. SOC. 841 (1995). In
traditional demand estimation, the challenge is to find the relationship between
the price and quantity sold of a good. Unfortunately, third variables (e.g.,
product quality, and time variation in demand) that could change price and
quantity (because the firm makes pricing decisions with some knowledge of
these factors) were omitted. Therefore, regressions of the effect of a price
change on the demand, when they use non-experimental observational data is
used, tend to be biased (because firms tend to raise their prices when
unobserved product quality changes). Economists solve this problem by
identifying natural experiments, such as supply shocks, that change only the
quantity supplied but not the quantity demanded. There are countless
approaches. The “BLP instrument” is a particularly influential method because
it effectively uses an observable aspect of a product—its unusualness in the
space of products—as a source of pseudo-experimental variation.
123 Erik Brynjolfsson et al., GDP-B: Accounting for the value of new and free goods
in the digital economy, Nat’l Bur. Econ. Res. Paper No. w25695 (2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3356697.
Increasing
the consumption of free digital goods increases welfare but might not show up
in revenues, GDP, or productivity.
124 Erik Brynjolfsson & Avinash Collis, How should we measure the digital
economy?, 97 HARV. BUS. REV. 140 (2019).
121
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increasing availability of zero-price digital goods is only partly
captured in GDP through advertising revenues in this sector; yet
those revenues are not directly connected to consumer welfare.125
To overcome this challenge, Avinash Collis, Erik
Brynjolfsson, and others devised a novel way of measuring
welfare from digital goods through massive online choice
experiments. 126 To calibrate their model, Professors Benzell and
Collis extended this choice experiment approach to gauge
demand for Facebook as well as network effects within Facebook.
Measuring welfare gains and simulating counterfactual
scenarios require estimating the demand curve for that good—
specifically, the elasticity of demand to changes in Facebook’s
advertising level, price, or quality. In addition, modelers of
Facebook must measure the change in Facebook’s value to users
as a function of the number of users of different types on the
platform—in short, the matrix of network effects on the
platform. 127
For free digital goods where market prices are not available,
online choice experiments can be used to estimate demand at a
certain price. Here Benzell and Collis relied principally on a single
binary discrete choice experiment, in which a user of a digital
good (e.g., Facebook) is asked to make a choice between accessing
the good or foregoing it for a certain period in exchange for a

Erik Brynjolfsson et al., Measuring the impact of free goods on real household
consumption, in AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 110, pp. 25-30 (2020); M.
Spence & B. Owen, Television programming, monopolistic competition, and welfare
Q. J. ECON. 103 (1977).
126 Brynjolfsson et al., supra note 113; Erik Brynjolfsson et al., Measuring welfare
with massive online choice experiments: A brief introduction, in AEA PAPERS AND
PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 108, pp. 473-76 (2018).
127 G. G. Parker & M. W. Van Alstyne, Two-sided network effects: A theory of
information product design, 51 MANAGEMENT SCI. 1494 (2005). Network effect is
a phenomena when the value of a good depends on the number of other users
who use that good. Facebook exhibits network effects because the value a user
gets from using Facebook increases with the number of other users (friends)
who use Facebook.
125
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certain payment. 128 Representative samples of US online
populations were recruited from market research companies. In
our study, we use Google Surveys to recruit our sample. 129 Each
respondent is offered a certain price. Prices are varied across
respondents. Aggregating responses across thousands of people
allows us to estimate a demand curve: for any given price, we can
estimate the number of people who would refuse the bargain
rather than relinquishing the free good.
Over 57,000 US respondents were recruited on Google
surveys to take part in the Benzell-Collis study. The surveys were
hosted on various publishers online (instead of advertisements),
and readers had to respond before unlocking premium content.
The respondents were representative of the online population and
were generally not professional survey-takers—as would be the
case with many academic surveys. Google provided Benzell and
Collis with the gender and age of every respondent based on their
Google profiles and browsing history. From this data, they
divided Facebook users into 12 market segments based on gender
and age bracket (18-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55-64; and 65+).
To measure the demand curve for Facebook, Benzell and
Collis asked respondents whether they would rather maintain
access to Facebook or relinquish it for one month in exchange for
a certain price level. The prices we choose for this study were $5,
$10, $15, and $20. In addition, they also conducted surveys to
gauge respondents’ number of friends on Facebook and the
composition of their friends by different demographic groups.
To measure the implicit price users pay for Facebook in the
form of seeing advertisements, Benzell and Collis directly asked
users for their willingness to pay to not view any ads on Facebook
for one month. To calculate how much ad revenue Facebook

The amount of payment for a consumer to forego a good is referred to as
their willingness to accept (WTA) for that good.
129
Custom
Surveys,
GOOGLE
https://marketingplatform.google.com/about/surveys/ (last accessed Mar.
5, 2022).
128
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makes from a demographic segment, Benzell and Collis used the
Facebook ad API and data from corporate annual reports on
advertising revenues.
Previous analysis had uncovered heterogeneity in the
valuation of Facebook by user subgroups. For example, that
women and older users gained comparatively greater benefits
from usage. 130 The results of the Benzell-Collis study are
consistent with this insight from existing literature.
As one novel innovation, the Benzell-Collis study adapted
choice experiments to measure Facebook’s network effects. The
economists measured not only the total value created by Facebook
but also the value created by linkages between various agegender demographic groups. Respondents were asked whether
they would choose to unfriend a certain demographic group for
one month in exchange for a range of monetary compensations.
Figure 1 displays the estimated matrix of relative network effects
provided to and from Facebook users who are 65+ and female and
those who are 18-25 and male.

130

Brynjolfsson et al., supra note 113.
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The final piece of data to calibrate the Benzell-Collis model is
the Facebook’s potential user base. For this, the authors used
census data on the U.S. population, broken down by the
demographic groups from surveys, as the potential market sizes.
2. Quantifying “Internalities” of Facebook
In the baseline Benzell-Collis model, social welfare is the sum
of consumer welfare and Meta’s corporate profits (monetary and
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non-monetary) from Facebook. However, Facebook undoubtedly
incurs certain costs. The next two Subsections explores such costs
and whether they are quantifiable; these Subsections proceed by
distinguishing between costs to users (“internalities”) and to
nonusers (“externalities”).
In standard economic welfare models, consumers choose
whether to utilize a good based on their goals and their
assumptions about how the good might further their goals. Of
course, this no longer holds if consumers’ beliefs are
systematically wrong or if consumers act irrationally. One of the
most striking instances of irrational decision-making stems from
addition. 131 At least one study has uncovered evidence of
Facebook addiction, attributing it to mechanisms common to
other types of problematic Internet use (e.g., lack of selfpresentational skill and preference for online interactions, which
augments deficits in face-to-face communication). 132 Indeed, selfcontrol problems have been found to drive 31% of social media
use. 133 Other scholars counter that Facebook addiction is not
clearly distinguished from Internet addiction generally and that
there are so many uses for Facebook that the general label is
unhelpful. 134
If Facebook is being used irrationally, then its negative
consequences may not factor into users’ engagement. This would
131 Economists distinguish between rational and irrational addiction. Rational
addiction is when a consumer consciously chooses a product, with the
understanding that they will experience greater benefits from consuming over
time (or, conversely, experience pain from withdrawal). Irrational addiction is
when this long term impact on the welfare function is not internalized in the
individual’s decision, or when the individual makes intertemporally
inconsistent decisions due to a short-term temptation.
132 Tracii Ryan et al., The Uses and Abuses of Facebook: A Review of Facebook
Addiction, 3 J. BEHAV. ADDICTIONS 133 (2014).
133 Hunt Allcott et al., Digital Addiction, National Bureau of Economic Research
Pap. No. w28936 (2021).
134
Mark D. Griffiths, Facebook Addiction: Concerns, Criticism, and
Recommendations—A Response to Andreassen and Colleagues, 110 PSYCH. REP. 518
(2012).
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constitute an “internality” that a policymaker might wish to
account for. Bolstering such concerns, a recent leak of Meta’s
internal documents divulged concern within the company that
Facebook and Instagram have led to mental health issues among
many users, especially young women. 135
In correlational studies, independent researchers have
revealed both negative 136 and positive associations 137 between
social media use and subjective well-being. Yet these analyses
suffer from endogeneity issues—that is, whether individuals with
negative life events or poor subjective well-being
disproportionately choose to engage with social media. 138 A metaanalysis of popular large-scale datasets found a trivial and
economically insignificant association between social media use
and well-being. 139 According to this set of researchers, social

The Facebook Files, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/thefacebook-files-11631713039 (last accessed Mar. 6, 2022).
136 H.B. Shakya & N.A. Christakis, N. A., Association of Facebook use with
compromised well-being: A longitudinal study. 185 AM. J. EPIDEM. 203 (2017). For a
causal analysis using observational data from the early days of Facebook’s
rollout
between
2004-2006,
see
Luca Braghieri et al., Social Media and Mental Health (2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3919760.
137 M. Burke et al., Social network activity and social well-being, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 1909-1912
(2010). W.R. Hobbs et al., Online social integration is associated with reduced
mortality risk, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12980 (2016).
138 Another issue could be reverse causality—negative well-being causes
increased Facebook usage. See J. Cheng et al., Understanding perceptions of
problematic Facebook use: When people experience negative life impact and a lack of
control, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 1-13 (2019).
139 Specification curve analysis involves running all possible combinations of
models and reporting the frequency of a significant effect. See A. Orben & A.K.
Przybylski, The association between adolescent well-being and digital technology
use, 3 NAT. HUM. BEHAV. 173 (2019); A. Orben et al., Social media’s enduring effect
on adolescent life satisfaction, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 10226 (2019).
135
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media use explains at most 0.4% of the overall variation in
subjective well-being. 140
To analyze the relationship between Facebook use and wellbeing causally, one experiment made subjects deactivate
Facebook for one month and found that deactivation led to an
increase in some metrics of subjective well-being. 141 However,
this effect is modest and may not be lasting. Another experiment
had subjects reduce their social media usage for a longer period
(2.5 months) and found no significant effect on subjective wellbeing. 142 Altogether, the evidence is inconclusive on whether
social media use has a significant effect on subjective wellbeing. 143
Apart from addiction, another internality from Facebook is
the hassle of dealing with advertisements. Users likely value
privacy more than precisely targeted ads. 144 Moreover, ads might
be perceived as annoying and obtrusive if they take up screen
space. 145 Indeed, one experiment varying the level of annoyance
in ads found that the cognitive cost of being subjected to
advertising is $1 to $1.50 per thousand impressions. However,
targeted ads which are not obtrusive are received better by
consumers, i.e. there is a tradeoff between targeting and
obtrusiveness.() When consumers do opt out of targeting when
given a chance, it results in a loss of about $8.58 in ad spending
Orben & Przybylski, supra note 135. The authors find that this effect is
comparable to the association between seemingly neutral activities such as
eating potatoes on well-being.
141 Hunt Allcott et al., The welfare effects of social media, 110 AM. ECON. REV. 629
(2020).
142 Avinash Collis & Felix Eggers, Effects of restricting social media usage (2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3518744.
143 Other negative externalities could include mis-information and increased
political polarization. A recent causal study suggests that Facebook usage
causes increased political polarization. See R.E. Levy, Social media, news
consumption, and polarization: Evidence from a field experiment, 111 AM. ECON. REV
831 (2021).
140
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per consumer in the US. However, only a small percentage of
users opt out of targeting (0.23% of all ad impressions in the US).
Johnson, G. A., Shriver, S. K., & Du, S. (2020). Consumer privacy
choice in online advertising: Who opts out and at what cost to
industry?. Marketing Science, 39(1), 33-51.
Although Facebook does not charge users money, it generates
revenues through advertising—which constitutes an indirect
price that consumers pay for access. To account fully for
Facebook’s welfare, we must measure the welfare effects of
advertising. Advertising generates welfare advertisers and the
platform, of course, but it can also benefit consumers.
We measure the net private effect of advertising on
consumers using surveys as discussed above, but we should also
be mindful of the external effect of ad views on advertisers and
society. Here, though, definitive evidence is lacking. Existing
literature indicates that measuring the return on investment
(“ROI”) for advertising is challenging without large-scale,
randomized controlled trials; yet the majority of the ad campaigns
do not garner samples large enough to detect ROI. 146 Another
meta-analysis of 15 advertising field experiments on Facebook
comprising of 500 million users and 1.6 billion ad impressions
found that the average lift (i.e., the conversion rate from ads in the
treated group as a proportion of the conversion rate if they had
not been treated) from ad campaigns can range from -15% to
1,517%, implying a wide range of welfare estimates for the
advertiser and consumer (from better matching) depending on
the campaign. 147 We conclude, similarly to our analysis of the
other externalities below, that the net social effect of advertising

R.A. Lewis & J.M. Rao, The unfavorable economics of measuring the returns to
advertising, 130 Q. J. ECON. 1941 (2015). This particular study analyzed twentyfive large field experiments with major U.S. retailers on Yahoo involving
millions of users and generating $2.8 million in advertising expenditures
(which went to Yahoo).
147 B.R. Gordon et al., A comparison of approaches to advertising measurement:
Evidence from big field experiments at Facebook, 38 MARKETING SCI. 193 (2019) =.
146
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is difficult to estimate—beyond its direct impact on Facebook
profits and consumer welfare, which are included.
3. Quantifying Externalities from Facebook
Facebook can also benefit or harm members of society who
do not use the platform. One of the most potent critiques of social
media, and of Facebook in particular, has been the promotion and
dissemination of fake news. 148 The spread of fake news on
Facebook has been accused by the president of abetting efforts to
undermine elections 149 and of confusing the public about COVID19. 150 Although the FTC and state AGs did not focus on fake news
and misinformation in their complaints against the tech giant,151
scholars and policymakers have clamored for antitrust to attend
to noneconomic goals. 152
Whether Facebook’s propensity to spread fake news is
deleterious to society is beyond the scope of this Article. 153 While
148 Alexix C. Madrigal, What Facebook Did to American Democracy, ATLANTIC
(Oct.
12,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/what-facebookdid/542502/.
149 Open Letter to Facebook, BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/2961-2/ (last
accessed Mar. 6, 2022).
150 Covid Misinformation on Facebook Is Killing People—Biden, BBC NEWS (July 17,
2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-57870778.
151 Misinformation did not feature in the FTC complaint and only barely
registered in the state AG complaint, in part because of the narrow focus on
competition. See New York v. Facebook, Inc., Compl. No. ___, § 254 (Dist. Ct.
D.C. 2020) (“Due to Facebook’s unlawful conduct and the lack of competitive
constraints resulting from that conduct, there has been a proliferation of
misinformation and violent or otherwise objectionable content on Facebook’s
properties.”).
152 ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, BREAK ‘EM UP: RECOVERING OUR FREEDOM FROM BIG AG,
BIG TECH, AND BIG MONEY 12, 19, 56–57, 223–25 (2020); DAVID DAYEN,
MONOPOLIZED: LIFE IN THE AGE OF CORPORATE POWER 9–12 (2020); TIM WU, THE
CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 20–22 (2018).
153 For a brief literature review on the science of fake news, see David M.J. Lazer
et al., The Science of Fake News, SCIENCE (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.aao2998.
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misinformation certainly circulated on Facebook during the 2016
and 2020 U.S. presidential elections, 154 some scholars do not
perceive fake news playing a decisive role in electoral results.155
There has also been distribution of both valuable public health
information and misinformation about COVID-19 on social
media. 156 It is difficult to conclude, however, whether this
information improved or degraded the public health response to
the pandemic. 157 As First Amendment scholars deliberate the
The average American saw and remembered 1.14 fake news articles about
the 2016 election. See Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake
News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211 (2017).
155 For longer literature review on the role of fake news in the US elections,
concluding that it did not play a decisive role in 2016, see id. Allcott &
Gentzkow determined that “if one fake news article were about as persuasive
as one TV campaign ad, the fake news in our database would have changed
vote shares by an amount on the order of hundredths of a percentage point.”
For a study making a similar point, see Andrew Guess et al., Less Than You
Think: Prevalence and Predictors of Fake News Dissemination on Facebook, 5 SCI.
ADV. 1 (2019), https://www.science.org/doi/pdf/10.1126/sciadv.aau4586.
156 During April 2020 found that 64% of information shared about COVID
prevention was accurate, with the remainder being misleading (most of the
inaccurate content was questioning the efficacy of masks). Justyna Obiala et al.,
COVID-19 Misinformation: Accuracy of Articles about Coronavirus Prevention
Mostly Shared on Social Media, 10 HEALTH POL. & TECH. 182 (2021). Similarly,
information from “low credibility” sources such as the conspiracy website
Infowars relating to the pandemic on Facebook and Twitter was certainly
shared to a great extent, but on both websites more credible sources saw greater
distribution than less credibility sources. Kai-Cheng Yang, The COVID-19
Infodemic: Twitter versus Facebook, BIG DATA & SOC. (2021),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20539517211013861.
157 We cannot locate any reliable analysis of this question. There have been
scattered reports of perhaps hundreds of individuals harming themselves
through quack COVID-19 remedies learned about online. See Adam Forrest,
Coronavirus: 700 Dead in Iran after Drinking Toxic Methanol Alcohol to “Cure Covid19”,
INDEPENDENT
(Apr.
28,
2020),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/coronavirusiran-deaths-toxic-methanol-alcohol-fake-news-rumours-a9487801.html;
Alistair Coleman, “Hundreds Dead” Because of Covid-19 Misinformatoin, BBC
NEWS (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-53755067.
However, these numbers are small compared to the overall harm of COVID19.
154
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proper framework for online discourse, 158 the analytical
frameworks under antitrust would not encompass claims of social
harm from misinformation.
A related consequence of social media is that it has enabled
new types of political activism. For example, the Arab Spring
protests that culminated in the downfall of tyrants were tied to
social media. 159 On the other hand, social media may have created
a new type of political unrest which is inherently destructive and
nihilistic. 160 Whichever hypotheses are true, it is likely that the
political consequences of a hyper-networked society are also
beyond the scope of an antitrust analysis. 161
In short, uncertainty plagues estimates of unpriced
internalities and externalities from Facebook. Nonetheless, other
scholars may disagree. In our discussion of remedies below in
Section V, we do confront this uncertainty and note the
assumptions underpinning our assessment. To the extent that we
assume large negative internalities or externalities, we would
favor remedies that shrink the size of social media. These include
taxing the number of users of Facebook or breaking up Facebook.
If, however, we assume that these effects are either insignificant

See, e.g., Nabiha Syed, Real Talk About Fake News: Towards a Better Theory for
Platform Governance, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 337 (2017).
159 PHILIP N. HOWARD & MUZAMMIL M. HUSSAIN, DEMOCRACY’S FOURTH WAVE?:
DIGITAL MEDIA AND THE ARAB SPRING (2013).
160 MARTIN GURRI, THE REVOLT OF THE PUBLIC AND THE CRISIS OF AUTHORITY IN
THE NEW MILLENIUM (2014). Gurri argues that most social protest movements
have been ideologically driven and organized; the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall
Street, and Indignados movements were de-centralized and purely anti-statusquo. Gurri points to social media as enabling these events, by reducing elites’
monopoly on information. Decentralized social media led to the widespread
discrediting of many elites and experts (by promoting the relative importance
and salience of scandals) and by allowing essentially leaderless publics to
coordinate large-scale protests.
161 We are reminded of the apocryphal response of Zhuo Enlai to a question on
the influence of the French Revolution—that it was “too early to say.” See Not
Letting the Facts Ruin a Good Story, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST,
https://www.scmp.com/article/970657/not-letting-facts-ruin-good-story.
158

3/7/2022 2:39 PM

DRAFT

2022]

FACEBOOK, WELFARE, & NATURAL MONOPOLY

49

or positive, or if we believe they lie beyond the scope of antitrust,
then we would prioritize the other remedies.
D. Model Limitations
The Benzell-Collis approach to the welfare effects of antitrust
remedies is powerful and flexible. It allows policymakers to
calculate the heterogenous distributional and aggregate
consequences of different policies. However, it does face
limitations.
The first set of limitations on the Benzell-Collis model are
practical—including, most prominently, the difficulty of
measuring externalities from Facebook usage. In this context, an
externality would be a social consequence of Facebook usage that
does not manifest as consumer value. As explored in the prior
Subsection, examples of negative externalities include fake news
and political conflict. These are counterbalanced by positive
externalities such as efficiencies from more targeted advertising.
While our model explicitly allows for such externalities to be
folded into the welfare calculus, precisely measuring these effects
is incredibly difficult.
Relatedly, the Benzell-Collis model assumes that Facebook
usage is rational and that its proximate personal consequences are
understood by users. However, to the extent that users harbor
incorrect beliefs about the platform’s consequences for their own
wellbeing, or to the extent that Facebook usage reflects
nonrational addiction, consumer demand may not be the best
gauges of social welfare. The model would therefore have to
incorporate internalities—or nonpriced negative consequence of
Facebook on users. 162 As with externalities, doing so does not
Hunt Allcott & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Internalities, J. POL’Y ANAL. &
MGMT. 698 (2015); Hunt Allcott & Cass R. Sunstein, Counterpoint to six potential
arguments against “Regulating Internalities,” 34 J. POL’Y ANAL. & MGMT. 712
(2015). Allcott and Sunstein tackle the argument for governments to attempt to
measure and design regulatory policies with the goal of maximizing social
162
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present a theoretical difficulty, but it does pose a measurement
challenge.
Another practical limitation is that our current model only
tackles Facebook usage in the U.S. This is incomplete, given that
domestic policy could shape the habits of non-U.S. users. 163 While
the model could account for such users, quantifying their demand
is beset by practical difficulties.
Internal, nonpublic characteristics of Facebook are also
important for the Benzell-Collis model, including details
surrounding how Facebook price-discriminates among different
user types (in the sense of showing different quantities of
advertising). The better that Facebook can price discriminate (that
is, identify how many ads a user can be shown without leaving
the platform), the lower the potential distortions from monopoly
power—but also the more negative the impact on inequality and
distributional equity.
Theoretical ones can hobble welfare quantification as well.
The Benzell-Collis model handles competition between the digital
platform and other firms in a simplified way. It is well suited to
simulating the extreme cases of residual monopoly and perfect
competition but less adept at dynamic rivalry between Facebook
and a hypothetical direct competitor providing Facebook-like

welfare net of internalities. They focus on an application to energy efficiency
standards, as these are welfare-improving regulations if consumers of durable
goods do not fully internalize the long-term benefits of less expensive to power
devices. Brian F. Mannix & Susan E. Dudley, Please don’t regulate my internalities,
34 J. POL’Y ANAL. & MGMT. 715 (2015). As a counterpoint, it is absurd to assume
that consumers are irrational but that unaccountable regulatory bureaucracies
are rational, benign, and know consumers’ interests better than themselves.
163 If non-U.S. users of Facebook also leave or join the platform in response to
Americans’ changing usage, and if Americans value non-U.S. participation,
then our estimates of the effect of remedies below will still be directionally
correct, but will be underestimates, because total participation will be more
elastic overall. See Seth G. Benzell & Avinash Collis, supra note 9.
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social media services. 164 Relatedly, the model is not tailored to
comparing the impact on dynamism and innovation between
monopolized and competitive environments. 165
Finally, the Benzell-Collis model treats both advertisers and
users as “atomistic” price-takers. 166 If users or advertisers can
band together and collectively bargain, then many additional
equilibria are possible. That said, despite these theoretical
limitations, our model is still well suited to describing the welfare
consequences of different equilibria. In Section V, we consider a
scenario in which Facebook’s revenues from advertisers are
rebated to users, perhaps as result of collective bargaining. While
our model is not ideal for determining the outcomes of a collective
bargaining-based negotiation between users and a platform, it can
nonetheless calculate the welfare consequences of different
possible negotiated outcomes.
V. ASSESSING POSSIBLE REMEDIES
The recent filings by the FTC and State AGs can result in a
variety of remedies. Courts enjoy wide discretion in selecting
164 Because of the possibility of multi-homing, and because of their strong
supply- and demand-side economies of scale, competition between platforms
exhibits path dependence and multiple equilibria effects. One way this
manifests is through preferential attachment, due to which platforms that have
small initial advantages in user base are more like to grow to dominate the
market. See Jérôme Kunegis et al., Preferential attachment in online networks:
Measurement and explanations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH ANNUAL ACM WEB
SCIENCE CONFERENCE (2013).
165 On one hand, allowing Facebook to make large profits might give Meta the
resources to invest in additional innovations. The research labs of Xerox PARC
and Bell Labs were both highly innovative and supported by electronics
monopolies. The profitability of Facebook may also induce additional
entrepreneurs to enter with big new ideas. On the other hand, an entrenched
monopoly may become sclerotic and unable to innovate and may squash
entrant’s innovations. See Steven Berry et al., Do Increasing Markups Matter?
Lessons from Empirical Industrial Organization, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 44 (2019).
166 I.e., without any power beyond personally accepting or rejecting any offer
by Meta for Facebook services.
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among structural and behavioral remedies, including fines,
divestitures, price regulation, forced sharing, and compulsory
licensing. 167 Indeed, judges can devise bespoke remedies that
regulators might not be able to craft. 168 Because regulation
expressly targeting digital platforms does not currently exist,
antitrust provides the primary checks, and given the current
sentiment toward big tech, we can expect courts and prosecutors
to act boldly.
Yet effective remedies must be based on the economics of the
Facebook Blue App. In this Article, we go a step further by
advancing a specific calibrated model of Facebook to estimate the
magnitude of effects. To those ends, this Section evaluates the
remedies that courts may impose on Facebook, as well as the
solutions that may flow when the legislative cavalry arrives.
To simulate the consequences of various interventions, we
calculate platform participation and social welfare through a
series of cascades. First, we estimate the platform’s optimal level
of monetization in the new environment. We calculate how
platform participation would fluctuate based on the change in
environment and platform monetization. This is the first
“cascade” model. Second, we calculate how much users would
increase or reduce their participation based both on the new
environment and the initial change in usage in the first cascade.
Subsequent cascades replace the usage level with that in prior
cascades. If the network is stable, eventually these cascades peter
out, and the network reaches a new equilibrium; if the network is
unstable, that equilibrium would be an unravelling—i.e., a chain
reaction that leads to most users to depart.
Metaphorically, just as a rock thrown into a pond creates a
series of circular ripples outward until the pond comes to rest

See Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestitures in
Networked Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2001). Relatedly, if the Department of
Justice resolves an antitrust suit with a consent decree, the Tunney Act seldom
acts as a constraint.
168 Hovenkamp, supra note 38.
167
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again, a shock to platform participation by one group has
subsequent effects on other users’ participation (and so on). We
evaluate the platform’s outcome under this estimation of their
optimal strategy. We then continue anticipating new strategies
iteratively and calculating the implications, until we identify the
platform’s optimal strategy.
To make this more concrete, consider how this simulation
works when Facebook faces a new tax. Based on the new tax, we
can guess what Facebook’s new optimal level of advertising might
be. We then evaluate how much the users subjected to the higher
level of advertising reduce their participation given this price
increase alone. This establishes the first cascade of the new policy.
Yet we know from network effects that platform usage depends
on the number of other users. Hence, this first reduction in
Facebook usage from one group lowers the incentives for their
friends to participate. This, in turn, reduces participation by other
groups who are friends with the second set of users, and so on.
Once these cascades reach users who care less about network
effects from the prior groups, or hold lower opportunity costs for
their time (and will use Facebook anyway, despite its reduced
quality), the cascades run out of momentum. At that point, the
network settles into a new equilibrium with new levels of
participation, user welfare, and monopolist profit.
Facebook currently contributes approximately $14 billion a
month in social welfare, with 12.7% of this surplus coming from
Facebook’s net-ad revenue and the remaining 87.2% accruing to
consumers in the form of surplus value. 169 By this measure,
Facebook is already creating a large amount of value both to its
customers and to its shareholders. Could anti-trust remedies
unlock even more value from an entrenched monopolist? We now
turn to the welfare effects of potential interventions.

Seth G. Benzell & Avinash Collis, Modeling Effective Regulation of Facebook
(Oct. 2020), https://hai.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/202010/HAI_DEL_PolicyBrief_Oct20.pdf
169
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A. Divestiture
Divestitures have played a prominent role in antitrust’s
attempts to constrain big tech. In 1982, the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) split the Bell Operating Company into seven legacy
carriers that had to compete against one another while providing
upstarts access to their infrastructures. 170 This Consent Decree
cleared the way for Microsoft to emerge a generation later—until
Microsoft, too, abandoned some of its core business, catalyzing
Yahoo and Google’s eventual rise. 171
Recently, scholars have pressed for more aggressive breakups
of tech platforms. Here antitrust provides a path. Section 7(A)(i)
of the Hart-Scott-Rodina Act allows the FTC and DOJ to challenge
mergers even after approval. 172 Hence, the Instagram and
WhatsApp acquisitions, despite FTC clearance, can be
unwound. 173 And because breakups have a fairly positive track
record in business and administrative law, they may not be as
fearsome as antitrust scholars previously thought. 174
To be sure, the literature on antitrust divestitures has not
settled into a consensus. Chicago school adherents would unwind
mergers only when there is clear evidence that it would increase
consumer welfare. On the other hand, the New Brandeisians
criticize regulators for not having done enough to restrain
mergers, creating an economy stifled by monopolies. 175 Under
See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Modification of Final Judgment § II.A, reprinted in
United States v. AT&T, 552 F.Supp. 131, 227 (D.D.C. 1982).
171 Ben Thompson, But see Where Warren’s Wrong, STRATECHERY (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://stratechery.com/2019/where-warrens-wrong/ (arguing that antitrust
intervention against Microsoft wasn’t important to the rise of google).
172 15 U.S.C. § 18a(i)(1).
173 See Patel, supra note 6.
174 See Rory Van Loo, In Defense of Breakups: Administering a “Radical” Remedy,
105 Cornell L. Rev. 1955 (2020).
175 Chicago school adherents would maintain that by focusing on consumer
welfare alone, the new Brandeisians were biasing their analysis in favor of
intervention by ignoring the role of producer welfare, or profits, in their
170
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this view, economic analyses of the impact of mergers and
acquisitions ignore important “curse(s) of bigness.” These include
bamboozling judges and juries with expert witnesses, aggressive
lobbying, and hard-to-detect pressure on smaller competitors.176
Further, the argument goes, even when breakups and merger
preventions do not maximize short-term consumer welfare, they
make markets more contested overall, increasing opportunity for
new, innovative companies to enter and decreasing the distorting
role of monopolies in politics.
Whatever one’s stance on this debate, understanding the
economic consequences of antitrust divestiture is an important
first step. Using our model, we simulate the impact of three
possible results of a Facebook breakup: a duopoly without crossplatform network effects; a vertical breakup that does not lead to
more competition for Facebook Blue; and perfect competition.
An injunction to split up Facebook could create an oligopoly,
with each firm controlling a portion of the market for Facebook
Blue-like services. This is similar to the landscape of telephone
service after the Justice Department broke up the Bell system into
seven Regional Bell Operating Companies.
We first simulate outcomes in the case where divestiture
leads to a duopoly, with no users multi-homing (i.e., using both
platforms) and no communication (and therefore network effects)
allowed across the two platforms. A breakup of this kind does
indeed boost competition in one sense: rates of advertising
decrease as the two firms are forced to fight harder for customers.
This leads to a 49.5% decrease in total advertising revenues across
the successor firms. However, the resulting decrease in profit per
user does not increase consumer or social welfare. In fact,
consumer welfare and user participation decrease by 33% and

analysis. Classical economic theory would suggest that profits must also be
counted in an analysis designed to maximize social welfare. See Naomi R.
Lamoreaux, The Problem of Bigness: From Standard Oil to Google, 33 J. ECON.
PERSP. 94 (2019).
176 Id.
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21.8%, respectively, because the overall Facebook Blue experience
is harmed by plummeting network effects. The average user
would experience a 60.9% reduction in the number of social media
connections.
Another possibility is a vertical divestiture that cleaves
Facebook from Instagram or WhatsApp. This would likely not
engender direct competition for Blue-like services. Indeed, the
FTC noted that Zuckerberg himself viewed these entrants not as
direct “Facebook Clones” but, rather, as products for alternative
“social mechanics.” 177 Consequently, we simulated vertical
divestiture as a slight erosion in Facebook Blue quality, either
through depriving Facebook of skilled social media engineers or
through reducing data network effects across the two
platforms. 178
We hypothesize that a vertical breakup might mean that 5%
of the U.S. population loses interest in Facebook Blue. If so, this
approach somewhat reduces Facebook’s rate of advertisement, as
it must work harder to attract users. However, it also shaves
consumer welfare in equilibrium by 5.3%. A reduction in network
effects corresponding to even a slight loss (2.1%) of Facebook
Blue’s original userbase overwhelms the benefits from less
intensive monetization. In theory, this reduction in welfare might
be offset by the flourishing of an independent WhatsApp or
Instagram, but those benefits are speculative. The FTC filing notes
Zuckerberg’s insistence that “The integration plan involves
building their mechanics into our products rather than directly
integrating their products if that makes sense.” If Facebook is a
natural monopoly, social benefits should flow from the platform’s
integration of innovations into its core products. 179

FTC Complaint, supra note 3, at para. 14.
A German regulatory injunction already prevents some data sharing across
these services.
179 See Ben Thompson, Why Facebook Shouldn’t Be Allowed to Buy tbh,
STRATECHERY (Oct. 23, 2017), https://stratechery.com/2017/why-facebookshouldnt-be-allowed-to-buy-tbh/.
177
178
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B. Mandatory Interoperability
Less draconian than (or perhaps in combination with)
complete divestiture, one proposal for a negotiated consent
decree would attempt to preserve network effects across
Facebook Blue’s successors while reducing the cost of market
entry.
This
alternative
is
known
as
“mandated
180
interoperability.”
If enough Facebook Blue competitors are
induced to enter, and users can communicate freely with each
other across platforms, Facebook’s market power will greatly
abate without destroying positive network effects on Facebook
Blue-like services and, therefore, hampering consumer welfare.
Doctrinally, mandatory interoperability traces its origins to
the sharing remedy in United States v. Terminal Railroad Association
of St. Louis over a century ago.181 This became the basis for
variations on a duty to deal with rivals, such as the essential
facilities doctrine. 182 This doctrine has been invoked to open up

The details of how mandated interoperability would be technically achieved
is beyond the scope of this Article but has recurred with increasing frequency
as a solution to tech dominance. See Luís Cabral et al., Stigler Center Report
(2021); Geoffrey Parker et al., Digital Platforms and Antitrust (2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3608397; Luís Cabral
et al., The EU Digital Markets Act: A Report from a Panel of Economic Experts (2021),
https://ide.mit.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/jrc122910_external_study_report__the_eu_digital_markets_act.pdf. Outside digital platforms, it can be found in
other infrastructures and multisided platforms. See, e.g., National Securities
Clearance Corporation.
181
224 U.S. 383 (1912).
182
An essential facilities claim is established if: (1) a monopolist controls a facility
that (2) a competitor is unable practically or reasonably to duplicate and (3) use of the
facility is denied to the claimant, even though (4) it is feasible for the monopolist to
provide access. MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 113233 (7th Cir. 1983).
180
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access to a railroad terminal, 183 ski slopes, 184 electricity delivery,185
news wire membership, 186 and local telephone exchanges. 187
Interoperability would alter Facebook’s data ownership
rights. It would force the company to make freely available,
through APIs, the core data driving its product. Premised on the
view that platforms are an essential facility or bottleneck to
downstream markets, this remedy dismantles the network barrier
to entry that protects social media incumbents, enabling users to
access content from friends on rival platforms. 188 This is one of the
most widely contemplated reforms of big tech, and it could be
accomplished either by court order (to give maximum effect to
divestiture) or regulation. 189
We estimate that interoperability would raise user
participation by 5.2% and consumer welfare by 6.6%, or $806.5
million dollars per month, at the cost of all advertising profits.
Still, the net effect is to boost social welfare by 4.8% overall.
C. Fines and Taxes
While the FTC and State AG complaint focuses on injunctive
remedies, 190 fines and monetary damages are permissible as well.
Damages might be assessed only once (either because of perfect
subsequent compliance or due to future lax enforcement) or recur
as a cost of doing business. Relatedly, taxes comprise another
mechanism to transfer some of Meta’s gains, equitably
183Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. at 411-12.
184Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 609-11.
185Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 380-82.
186Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1945).
187Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 415 (2004).
Stigler report, supra note 14.
In fact, the EU’s new draft Digital Services Act and Data Governence Acts
also contemplates interoperability mandates for large-scale data gatekeepers,
though details are still developing. See Parker et al., Digital Platforms and
Antitrust, supra note 177.
190 FTC Compl., supra note 3, at § X.
188
189
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redistributing from shareholders to government programs, and
forcing it to bear costs from any sins. As an economic matter,
taxation is identical to a predictably recurring fine; as a legal
matter, however, taxes and antitrust fines derive from divergent
authorities. 191
Federal courts do not possess the power to tax, so this remedy
will not arise from the FTC and State AG complaint. Nonetheless,
because legislation expressly targeting big tech does not currently
exist, the stakes in the litigation are high, and courts will face
pressure to craft broad solutions as a stopgap until the legislative
cavalry arrives. For the remainder of this Section, then, we shall
model the effects of bold remedies, whether they derive from
statute or antitrust litigation. 192
Several counties are currently considering digital service
taxes 193 to carve out a share of profits derived from “operations
in” such countries. These proposals counteract the base erosion
and profit shifting (“BEPS”) strategies that multinational
companies deploy to minimize taxation. 194 Most prominently,
France recently issued a 3 percent on all revenues from digital
services, which includes advertising (Facebook’s dominant source
of revenue) for a handful of large American companies.
The impact of these taxes depends on Meta’s perceptions and
reactions. If the company perceives these policies as a levy on its
sheer size and number of active users, Facebook will shift its focus
from cultivating a large userbase to maximizing profits per user.
Alternatively, if these policies are interpreted as a tax on revenues
Taxes assessed by Congress, while fines may be imposed by courts under
the antitrust laws.
192 Realistically, given Facebook’s network effects, market share, and
propensity to harm competition, a finding of market power under antitrust law
will be straightforward. However, despite a court’s wide arsenal of tools under
its injunctive powers, antitrust remedies have always been limited. Divestiture
may be at the outer bounds of possibilities.
193
See Paul Romer, Taxing Digital Advertising (May 21, 2021),
https://adtax.paulromer.net/.
194 Note, though, that it can be complicated to figure out “where” a service is
created for a corporation.
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or profits, Meta will prioritize amassing a large userbase on
Facebook. This second scenario fosters a larger Facebook with
greater network effects and fewer advertisements.
We estimate that a 3% tax on Facebook Blue’s U.S. revenues
would generate $43 million a month for government coffers and
raise consumer surplus by 1.1% a month. Users benefit directly
from reduced advertising, as well as from the additional network
effects of a 1.3% bump in the userbase. While Meta loses out on a
share of its current profits, social welfare increases by 1.1%
overall.
By contrast, a tax on the number of users that generates the
same government revenues would lower post-tax Meta profits by
a smaller amount. However, it would slightly depress the size of
the userbase, consumer welfare, and total social surplus (each by
about –0.1%). This is because Facebook would intensify
advertising to squeeze more revenue out of a smaller userbase. Of
course, if policymakers adopted an explicit goal of reducing social
media usage, perhaps because of negative externalities that we do
not model (such as disinformation and addictive capacity), then a
per-user tax might be an apt tool.195
D. Data Unions
One innovative proposal to rein in tech platforms is the “data
pools” or “data as labor” approach, which would work to enable
collective bargaining between platforms and data unions. 196 Users
would pool together to associate with a data union that negotiates
Of course, taxes have been assailed for potentially discouraging innovation
See Berry et al., supra note 161, at 56.
196 See ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING
CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY (2018). See also Radical
Exchange Foundation, The Data Freedom Act, Draft Legislation and Commentary
(2020), https://www.radicalxchange.org/files/DFA.pdf; Erik Rind & Matt
Prewitt, If Data Is Labor, Can Collective Bargaining Limit Big Tech?, TECHCRUNCH,
Oct. 12, 2020, https://techcrunch.com/2020/10/12/if-data-is-labor-cancollective-bargaining-limit-big-tech/.
195
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on their behalf with digital platforms. Backed by collective action,
users could demand changes to data usage or advertising
practices—and even compensation.
Data as labor is a sweeping change that would likely require
legislation. Yet it could solve some antitrust problems with zeroprice markets, where consumers do not pay fees to use a product
but instead trade their attention and privacy. 197 Currently, no
mechanism exists for consumers to directly sell their attention and
personal data, so we rely on barter for social media services
instead. Data unions would solve two problems: they could
confer users greater bargaining power, and they could fill in a
missing market. Direct compensation for usage fosters positive
network effects (by encouraging more people to use the platform)
while limiting advertising (which is indispensable to platform
operators) to where it is most productive. Like interoperability, it,
too, alters the data ownership rights of digital platforms.
In our simulations, we postulate a strong data union that
gives Facebook an ultimatum to rebate users for all of its
advertising revenues. We find this would raise consumer surplus
by 17.8%; half of this figure results from the rebates themselves,
and half flows from increased network effects due to a larger
userbase. More generally, a benefit of this approach would be to
give users of platforms more voice in how their data is used and
monetized.
Nonetheless, data as labor faces severe implementation
challenges. For example, scammers can generate “fake” user data
to drive compensation for platform usage. Additionally, unions
must be empowered in ways that convey them actual leverage.
California’s recent experience with Proposition 22 suggests that
many stakeholders will simply back down from demands for
redistribution if the platform credibly threatens to exit.
VI. CONCLUSION

197

See John M. Newman, supra note 27; Erika M. Douglas, supra note 36.
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Of the feasible antitrust solutions for platform monopolies,
the Benzell-Collis model suggests that data unions may be the
most viable path for Facebook. Nonetheless, it requires significant
alterations to how platforms and their consumers currently
interact. Alternatively, taxes and fines can be couched within the
existing legislative and regulatory framework; these options
would still preserve positive network effects while enhancing
social welfare. Finally, interoperability remains a promising
compromise between the extremes of data unions and taxes or
fines.
However, to fully assess the welfare impact of judicial and
regulatory interventions, significant information is still required.
Solutions that are too narrow will be ineffectual, but solutions that
are overly broad may compromise Facebook’s efficiencies while
incurring excessive monitoring costs. Our analysis is based on
public information and online surveys. Yet a regulator with access
to Facebook’s private metrics on platform usage, advertising, and
costs would be able to estimate a version of our model with much
more precision and confidence.
Sectoral regulators might eventually require Facebook to
conduct experiments to measure relevant network effects and
elasticities of demand. Such information is potentially even more
useful than descriptive statistics. For example, measurements of
how residual demand for the platform changes after a rival firm
enters or is eliminated can help define markets and evaluate
whether competition was harmed or enhanced. If Facebook’s
markups change without a corresponding change in residual
demand, this can be evidence of strategies to counter the threats
of competition or a new entrant. We can expect that digital
platforms such as Facebook, with their plethora of analytic
techniques, conduct these exercises frequently, so these “platform
stress tests” would not be unduly burdensome to implement.
Ultimately, we hope that our work drives scholars,
regulators, and policymakers to create their own models of social
welfare as well. We would welcome the ensuing arguments over
variables, measurements, and calibrations. These debates would
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force antitrust to contend earnestly with modern economic
theory, driving solutions toward greater precision and broader
social benefits.

